Market imperfections of corporate financing in India :: the  Group  dominance. by Prasad, Shree
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst 
Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014 
1963 
Market imperfections of corporate financing in India :: the "Group" 
dominance. 
Shree Prasad 
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses 
Prasad, Shree, "Market imperfections of corporate financing in India :: the "Group" dominance." (1963). 
Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014. 3228. 
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/3228 
This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass 
Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu. 
MARKET IMPERFECTIONS OF CORPORATE 
FINANCING IN INDIA 
THE GROUP DOMINANCE 
mnaiifK 
SHREE PRASAD 
J9S3 
MARKET IMPERFECTIONS OF CORPORATE 
FINANCING IN INDIA 
—THE "GROUP" DOMINANCE 
by 
SHREE PRASAD 
Master of Arts 
University of Poona, India 
Submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for 
the degree of Master of Business Administration 
University of Massachusetts 
Amherst, Massachusetts 
1963 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
LIST OF TABLES. ill 
CHAPTER 
ONE. INTRODUCTION. 1 
TWO. INDIAN COMPANIES: ORGANIZATION AND 
INTERNAL FINANCES . 10 
THREE. THE BANKING COMPANIES IN INDIA AND 
THEIR PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRIAL 
FINA CING. 29 
FOUR. THE MANAGING AGENCY SYSTEM . 64 
FIVE. THE ORGANIZED CAPITAL MARKET. 8? 
SIX. CONCLUSION. 110 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 119 
APPENDIX. 122 
FOOTNOTES. 123 
iii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1.1 Industrial Progress in India Expressed in 
Terms of Industrial Production . 3 
II. 1 Corporate Sectors Sources of Funds. 18 
11.2 Capital Issues by the Government of India . . 18 
11.3 Percentage Contribution of Bonus Shares in 
Paid Up Cauital of Six Major Industries 
at the End of the Year 1953-5*+. • .. 21 
11.4 Bonus Shares in the Indian Capital Market , . 21 
11.5 Investment in Shares: 1958- 59 • .. 23 
11.6 Distribution of Earnings of Companies—1958 • 25 
11.7 New Profit & Profit Retention Rates for Public 
Limited Companies. •• 25 
11.8 Comparative Statement Showing Rates of Depre¬ 
ciation Allowed by the Fiscal Authorities 
in India and Other Foreign Countries .... 26 
111.1 Contribution of Different Agencies to 
Agricultural Credit ..  32 
111.2 Investments of the Imperial Bank of India 
in Governmental Securities: 19**7-5*+ .... 37 
111.3 Excerpts from the Consolidated Balance Sheets 
of the Banks in India ••••••. 39 
111.4 Analysis of the Investment Pattern of Sched¬ 
uled Banks.   42 
111.5 Corporate Stock: Amounts Outstanding .... *+6 
111.6 Commercial Banks Contribution to Bonds in U.S. 46 
111.7 Public Limited Companies—Sources of Funds 
(1946-51). 49 
111.8 Public Limited Companies—Sources of Funds 
(1951-55) . . . 50 
111.9 Public Limited Companies—Sources of Funds 
(1956- 58)   51 
iv 
Table Page 
111.10 Public Limited Companiesi Percent Bank Loans 
to Total Sources of Funds and Rates of 
Growth Correlation Analysis . 52 
111.11 All Scheduled Banks—Growth of Advances by 
ct r. 5I4. 
111.12 All Scheduled Banks—Growth of Advances to 
Industrial Sector . 55 
111.13 Sectorwise Distribution of Bank Advances ... 56 
111.14 Share of Bank Advances in Working Capital Needs 56 
111.15 Security Requirements on Outstanding Bank Loans 
to Medium and Small Scale Business. 58 
111.16 All Scheduled Banks—Distribution of Loans by 
Securities. . ..... . 59 
IV,1 Contribution of Managing Agents to Share 
Capital of New Companies. 70 
IV.2 Shares Held by Managing Agents in Managed 
Companies. 75 
IV.3 Changes In Shareholding of Managing Agents in 
Managed Companies . 76 
IV.4 Value of Shares Held by Managing Agents in 
Managed Companies .......  76 
IV.5 Lending Activities of the Managing Agents ... 80 
IV.6 Finances of Companies Under the Managing Agents 
in Indi . 80 
IV.7 Loans to Managed Companies by Managing Agents . 81 
IV. 8 Loans Guaranteed by Managing Agents .. 81 
V.l Percentage Distribution of Total Assets of Life 
Insurance Companies, 1939-1958 ....... 88 
V.2 Variation in Investment of Insurance Companies 
as a Percentage of Total Assets. 89 
V.3 Policies Outstanding and Investments of L.I.C.. 89 
V.*f Distribution of Life Insurance Investments as 
a Percentage of Total Assets . 91 
V 
Table Page 
V.5 Investment Trusts in India . . , . .. 9^ 
V.6 Reserves of Investment Trusts  9^ 
V.7 Capital Issue Brought to the Market as Compared 
to Capital Issue Floated Privately . 107 
V.8 Shares Obtained by Directors Under Offer for 
al . 107 
< 
* i , . 4 ' 4 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Indian corporate financing originated as a simple 
non-competitive system* It was characterized by person¬ 
alized methods, wherein the decisions were influenced by 
the opinions and judgments of a few individuals. Regula¬ 
tion by governmental agencies was inadequate and whatever 
changes occurred in the system owed much to the interest 
generated by new situations and needs for adoption. 
Changes in the government regulation were made because 
of the initiative taken in that direction by some pro¬ 
gressive-minded businessmen and industrialists. 
Over the past few decades, however, (particularly 
after India achieved independence in 19^7)» there has 
been a systematic attempt to modernize its financial 
institutions. The Government of India has assumed a major 
role in this modernization. Advice and assistance from 
private businessmen was availed of whenever it was avail¬ 
able and was not contradictory to the ends. This develop¬ 
ment of financial institutions has not been connected with 
or patterned after any particular school of thought, but 
the basis of present day corporate financing has been to 
a large extent British, in conjunction with recent influence 
from the U.S. It would appear that the government is taking 
1 
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particular interest in this development by fostering struc¬ 
tural changes so as to bring corporate organization more in 
line with British and U. S. pattern, Thus, the Companies 
Act, 1956, attempted reforms in various categories such as 
corporate capital structure; company meetings and procedures; 
preparation, presentation and auditing of accounts; forma¬ 
tion of Board of Directors and their powers and duties. Be¬ 
sides such measures which could be categorized as reform 
through changes and adaptation, other measures have been 
adapted to eliminate certain undesirable organizational 
patterns. Thus, it was enacted that the Managing Agents, 
that uniquely Indian system, cease operating after a period 
of four years. 
All these provisions reflect one systematic effort 
to change over to new type of organization patterns and 
practices. That such changes were highly essential and 
necessary cannot be questioned. Table 1.1 reflects the 
change that came over the Indian industrial scene in one 
decade. Such a development in the present context demands 
two prerequisites—capital and managerial skills. An indus¬ 
trial organization which fashions its corporate structure 
in the manner of western countries requires that managerial 
skills be available in quantity as well as quality. India 
has yet to evolve a purely managerial echelon of corporate 
industrial executives. On the topmost level of corporate 
industrial executive management the criteria that Influence 
the choice are entirely different. T^mily group or community 
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TABLE 1.1 
INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS IN INDIA EXPRESSED IN TERMS 
OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 
Items Unit 1950-51 1960-61 % increase 1965-66 
Estimated 
Steel Ingot Mill.Ton 1.4 3.5 150 10.2 
Finished 
Steel Mill.Ton 1.0 2.2 120 6.8 
Hydrochloric 
Acid 000 Ton 99 363 267 1500 
Cement Mill.Ton 2.7 8.5 215 13.0 
Caustic 
Soda 000 Ton ' 11 100 809 340 
Diesel 
Engines 000 Nos. 5.5 4o 627 66 
Cotton 
Textile Hi11.Yd'. 3720 5127 38 5800 
Bicycles 000 Nos. 101 1050 940 2000 
Automobiles 000 Nos. 16.5 53.5 22V - 
Installed Power 
Generation 
Capacity Mill.Kw 2.3 5.7 148 - 
Source: 1. "Investing in India"—Indian Investment 
Centre, New Delhi, 1961. Pp. 4-5. 
2. "Commerce," Bombay. Annual Numbers I960, 
1961. 
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affiliations are very strong. The organizational pattern of 
institutions involved in corporate financing appears very 
familiar to the western observers; yet the promotion and prac¬ 
tice reflect the insistence of the Indian businessmen to 
operate the seemingly westernized institutions in a typically 
Indian manner. India has all the institutions geared to a 
smooth flow of the financial resources of the country in the 
direction of industrial enterprises. Yet in practice these 
familiarities give way to inroads fraught with practices 
which at best could be described as purely Indian. 
Consider, for example, the system of investing in 
new securities issue. The Indian investor will check first 
the support the issue is receiving; what family or group 
is backing the issue, what has been the record of that 
family, what are the resources that back the group. On 
the basis of that information, the investor would perhaps 
decide whether any investment in that issue could be done. 
Quite possibly the group floating the issue has among its 
various organizations a firm engaged in investments. In such 
cases, the new issue will be subscribed to without much 
effort. 
Such a procedure is at variance with that followed 
in western countries.^ In these countries various risk 
factors are an essential feature of an investment policy. 
Future financial positions of issuers, future investors* 
attitudes, future level and structure of interest rates, 
and future purchasing power of the dollar are necessary 
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considerations. So are the so-called "non-risk factors,” 
like taxation, marketability and legality. An analysis of 
present and future business conditions and the selection and 
analysis of industries and companies is important. 
These considerations have never figured as prominently 
in the decisions made by Indian businessmen. They have re¬ 
sisted wherever possible any attempts to change the estab¬ 
lished structure and practices. The Government of India 
has battled continuously this conservative inertia and 
resistance. The Companies Act of 1956 and its subsequent 
amendments, the Regulation of Trading in Securities, the 
Life Insurance legislation, Control of Capital Issues and 
the Regulation of Banking represent the governmental efforts. 
Yet these efforts have always been resisted very strongly. 
The flood of memoranda resolutions and petitions which the 
various Chambers of Commerce and of industries, notably 
the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and In¬ 
dustries (FICCI) sent to the Parliament, various ministries 
and government agencies is indicatory of this resistance. 
The establishment and operation of a Forum of Free Enter¬ 
prise is a result of such organized resistance. 
Thus it would apoear that there is a contest be¬ 
tween the progressive element, spearheaded by the govern¬ 
ment, and the conservative elements made up of Indian 
businessmen and industrialists. Under a typically Indian 
system, an industrial enterprise is identified with its own 
controlling interests. This interest may be a person, a 
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family or a group; yet this identification is complete and 
the position of the interest is supreme, unique and unassail¬ 
able. The position of Sir Biren Mukerjee in Martin Burn 
Limited; of Lala Sir Sri Ram in the Delhi Cloth and General 
Mills Co. Ltd.; of Mr. Hasturbhai Lalbhai and Mr. Ambalal 
Srarbhai in the Textile and Dyes and Chemical industry in 
Western India are just a few examples of personal influence. 
The position of Birla Brothers, Dalmia-Jains, Singhanias, 
Jalans, Goenkas, Mafatlals, and above all Tatas, would be 
examples of family oriented influences. Under such a system 
the factors that influence all the decisions (including 
financial ones) are the ones that interest these personalities 
or family groups. 
The powers that such grouos have and the effect of 
such a power concentration will have to be measured negatively. 
That these groups have participated heavily in the industrial 
development of the country, can be seen from the ensuing 
discussions. The focus of attention here is two-fold. In 
the first place, it must be asked whether it is reasonable 
to expect a higher rate of growth and development in in¬ 
dustrial sphere in the light of financial market imperfections 
that are discussed in the dissertation. Secondly, it must 
be examined whether the control wielded by these groups 
cannot be challenged, and if it can be, what are the pos¬ 
sibilities. 
To provide satisfactory solution to these two points, 
it will have to be shown that India possesses a pseudo- 
western financial structure. This financial structure 
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consists of institutions that are similar to those in 
western countries. These institutions are controlled by 
various groups and used to own ends. This results in de¬ 
priving such new companies of finances as do not possess 
a support of these groups. In this manner, the group 
control thwarts independent industrial growth and develop¬ 
ment. To a description and discussion of the nature of 
this control the present dissertation will apply itself. 
The first part of Chapter Two discusses corporate 
structure at the present time. The Company Law, as it 
exists, has attempted to lessen the group influences. 
The provisions of law are discussed with a view to deter¬ 
mine their usefulness and effectiveness. Part two dis¬ 
cusses the source of funds as obtained in case of cor¬ 
porate finances with particular emphasis on the internal 
resources that are available to a company. 
Chapter Three outlines the organization of Banking 
business in India, the way in which the banks satisfy the 
financial needs of Indian industries. The criteria which 
influence the role of the bank is explained and contrasted 
with the role of banks in other countries. 
Chapter Four explains the mode of industrial organ¬ 
ization that is peculiar to India—the Managing Agency 
system. The nature of this organizational pattern, in¬ 
fluence and method of operation are discussed. 
Chapter Five explains the four facets of an organized 
capital market; how far they have developed, how far they 
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have adopted the Western system in operation will form the 
basis of discussion. 
Chapter Six attempts to summarize the information 
and the data presented evaluating it in the light of the 
problem posed. 
The problems which will be discussed here call for 
an enormous amount of factual data. On the spot personal 
interviews and evaluations from authoritative sources are 
usually necessary but since such appraisals were not pos¬ 
sible, attempts have been made to tap as many other sources 
as possible. However, the fact that certain data were 
unavailable made it necessary to impose certain limitations 
on the discussion. Recent data has been used wherever 
possible. The purely proprietary concerns and partnerships 
have been excluded and only the corporate organizations, 
private limited and public limited firms, have been con¬ 
sidered. Only manufacturing firms have been considered, 
thus eliminating automatically such firms that are exclusively 
trading and commercial. In the same way, Government owned 
and operated firms are not taken into consideration. Since 
the problem here pertains to finances for industries, any 
sector of money and capital market that does not affect 
finances for industries has not been considered. Those 
familiar with Indian money market may therefore notice the 
absence of any reference to the role played by the Reserve 
Bank of India, to the Bill Market and to the Bullion, The 
Bazar Market has been treated as a part of the Indigenous 
Banking Sector. Also excluded from the present discussion 
are the cottage industries and the small scale industries. 
Attention is focused on the large scale industries with 
possible reference to medium scale industries when necessary 
Such a circumspection is felt justified, since the organized 
corporate sector accounts for over 85# of the industrial 
production and over 90# of the capital employed in the 
private sector in India. 
This study does not claim to analyze the entire 
Indian industrial economy or the capital market in general. 
It concerns only that portion of industrial economy or 
capital market that affects the financial organization of 
Indian companies. For example, absence may be noticeable, 
therefore, of any reference to the operation of the Bank 
Bate system in India. Yet it can be justified on the 
ground that Indian money market is not rate conscious. 
A grant of loan or an advance is not dependent on a high 
or low Interest rate. Rather it is dependent, as the study 
will demonstrate, on the group affiliations involved. 
CHAPTER TWO 
INDIAN COMPANIES: ORGANIZATION AND INTERNAL FINANCES 
This chapter discusses the organizational pattern of Indian 
companies. The Indian format is contrasted with the U. S. 
pattern. The subtle difference and the circumstances which 
influence the Indian format are discussed. It is shown why 
the Indian format, in spite of its seemingly westernized 
nature, remain typically Indian in operation, susceptible to 
family-oriented group influences. 
The Internal Sources of Finance available to these companies 
are discussed. Different types of shares floated by the 
Indian companies are introduced. It is also explained why 
the Common stock or the Ordinary share is the most popular 
and why the Debenture and Preferred stock have not been made 
proper use of. The ownership of the common stock, leading 
to a position which allows inter-corporate investment, is 
discussed. How this peculiar share holding allows two 
important types of internal financing—reserves and depre¬ 
ciation—is shown. This holding makes it possible to 
restrict dividend and allows a build-up of reserves. At 
the same time the ownership-managerial combination allows 
the companies to use the depreciation provisions as long 
term advances or working capital. 
In this fashion the nature of the organization of Indian 
companies and their stock distribution allows retention of 
family or group oriented control and facilitates financing 
to the extent of 35% on the average, purely from internal 
finances. 
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Structural Organization of Indian Companies; 
Indian Joint stock corporate enterprise is organized 
fundamentally on the British model. It can broadly be divided 
into two categories—public and private. A Joint stock com¬ 
pany is private if by virtue of its articles of association, 
it has restricted the rights of its shares, limited the number 
of its members to fifty and, above all, prohibited any in¬ 
vitation to public subscription for shares of the company. 
Besides the Joint stock companies, the proprietary and 
partnership forms of organization are still prevalent. How¬ 
ever, the family oriented businesses and the industrial 
houses were quick to realize that the advantages of converting 
themselves into a private limited company were too great to 
be ignored. It allowed them to restrict any undesirable 
diffusion of ownership and at the same time avail themselves 
of the legal identity. Their private status allowed them 
interlocking Directorships (restricted to only 20 per person 
in case of Public Limited companies). It allowed them tax 
concessions, lower rates of taxes, considerable leeway where 
Director’s remunerations and Expense Accounts are concerned. 
Thus all the benefits and advantages were availed of. The 
private limited companies increased their share from 47.3/^ 
in 1938-39 to 66.5# in 1954-55. 
Though the legal position of business changed, its 
structure continued without any significant change. Even 
now the corporate organization in India differs from the one 
existing in the U.S. This is evident from the accompanying 
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chart comparing the organizational forms companies in the two 
countries assume. Thus in a typical U. S. company the board 
of directors are responsible to the shareholders and are en¬ 
trusted with making all the major policy decisions. These 
are put into effect by the Chairman and the President of the 
Corporation. The President functions through his Executive 
Vice President and other Vice Presidents. The lines of 
authority descend in the order and each officer is responsible 
to his immediate superior. Each officer has a clear-cut idea 
of his proper function, his position in the organization and 
his duties as well as rights. 
As against this the Indian companies are singularly 
lacking in such a clarity. For example, Chart 2a traces the 
organizational pattern of a company that is not managed by 
the managing agents. The Board of Directors derives its 
powers from the shareholders but this is delegated to the 
Managing Director or the Director-in-Charge. He is assisted 
by a General Manager under whom are different departmental 
chiefs. Technically speaking the departmental chiefs are 
responsible to the General Manager. 
A similar situation is obtained where the board of 
directors has delegated all the authority in favor of the 
managing agents. The managing agents discharge their duties 
through the General Manager. On the surface of it, both these 
organizational forms look similar to that obtained in the U.S. 
Yet the way this pattern comes to be operated is very dis¬ 
similar. 
1. Corporate 
r~ 
v.p, 
Board of Directors 
Chairman and Chief Executive 
>!/ 
President 
4/ 
Executive Vice President 
v.p, 
—f— 
v.p, 
—? 
v.p, 
“1 
v.p. 
7 
v.p. 
. Corporate Organization of, a,, Typical, 
Not .jfenagod by Mnsftftlpfe /*■<«&». 
Indian Firm 
Board of Directors 
(2.a) 
Production Mgr Accountant Sales Mgr. 
Corporate Organization of a Typical Indian.Flrn 
Managed by Kanaglm -nK, Adopts 
Board of Directors 
i 
(2.b) General Manager 
Prod. Mgr. 
Managing Agent 
l 
etary 
Acct. Sales Mgr. 
denotes direct authority 
denotes indirect authority 
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In India the two functions of ownership and management 
are not separated or clearly demarcated. The chief executive 
of a typical company, as was seen in chart 2a, is the managing 
Director, or as in some recent cases, the Director-in-Charge. 
This position would correspond to that of a President and Chief 
Executive in a U.S. Corporation. The Managing Director is a 
prominent member of the Board of Directors. He is the repre¬ 
sentative of the group that holds the controlling interest, 
unless, as in some exceptional cases, he has been brought in 
because of his skills. Besides the Managing Director, no other 
company executive is likely to be a member of the Board. Thus, 
the Managing Director is the only communicating link between 
the Board and the officers of the company. There is no system 
of stock options for top executives in India, hence the com¬ 
pany officials are not likely to hold any shares, except in 
their individual personal capacity. Such a system is at once 
the cause and the effect of the fact that the owner is closely 
identified with the manager. The Managing Director emerges 
then as the single center of authority in the entire organ¬ 
ization on the one hand. On the other, the fact that he repre¬ 
sents the majority interest makes the theoretical lines of 
authority and responsibility, which a board is supposed to 
have, redundant. Theoretically a board is responsible to 
the shareholders, but this allegiance is nullified because 
the Managing Director represents the majority interest. Sim¬ 
ilarly, the officers of the company are supposed to be respon¬ 
sible to the Board, but in practice become responsible to the 
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Managing Director, since the board will have invariably re¬ 
signed the exercise of powers in favor of the Managing Director. 
Thus, one may repeat, the Managing Director, emerges as the 
single center of effective authority. His position is derived 
from association. His power is undeniable, able as he is, 
to fuse the dual functions of ownership and management. 
Similar fusion is seen in case of companies where 
managing agents are functioning. The authority of the board 
of directors exists only in name because the managing agents 
control the majority shareholding, and therefore are in a 
position to nominate the members of the board. 
The resulting managerial ownership organization leads 
to interesting changes in the concept of the function and 
powers of the board. Legally speaking, the board, as the 
representative of the shareholders, is the center of all the 
power and authority relevant to the administration of the 
company. However, because of the reasons explained above, 
the members of the Board are either completely deprived of 
their power (if the company is managed by the managing agents), 
or come to play a secondary role to those members of the board 
that represent the dominant interest. Advantages of such a 
position are assumed in nomination to the Board such persons 
as would be prominent in the particular field of the company, 
or that are likely to be of assistance to the company on account 
of their prominence in different fields such as Banking, Finance 
and so forth. These people are not likely to interfere in the 
actual working of the company. The effect of such situations 
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may be found in the emergence of multiple or interlocking 
directorships. 
The system of interlocking directorships is used by 
Indian businessmen to maintain control over divergent companies. 
An analysis of the distribution of directorships 
reveals that a large number of directorships are held 
by a minority of influential persons. In the Coal 
Industry, out of % companies, 51 companies with 247 
directorships are controlled by 28 persons, 7 of whom 
hold 64 directorships. In Jute, 267 directorships are 
held by 130 persons, 4 of whom have 82 directorships. 
In the joint stock companies surveyed by Mr. Ashok 
Mehta* there were 3*728 directorships distributed among 
1,103 persons 1 61 of whom held 1,039 directorships, 
while 20 of them held 805 directorships.^ 
The Government of India tried to discourage such a concentra¬ 
tion by making it unlawful for one individual to become a 
director in more than 20 companies. In effect this would 
release more openings for more directorships than exist at 
present. However, in practice this provision is thwarted by 
the simple relationship based on Group philosophy. For 
example, a directorship in a firm like Tata Sons would count 
for one directorship. However, in reality this would be as 
effective as a directorship in a dozen or more concerns since 
Tata Sons control and manage a dozen industrial enterprises. 
Similarly a directorship in Birla Brothers should qualify for 
more than one directorship since Birla Brothers Limited manage 
and/or control other industrial companies. A similar influence 
could be exercised by a director with Mafatlal Gagalbhai or 
Soorajmull Nagarmull or Sahu Jain or Juggilal Kamlapat - to 
cite a few examples where filial relationships are closer and 
more intimate accounting for greater influence. Such an 
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All such provisions were designed to affect the organ¬ 
ization and working of enterprises in different fields—in¬ 
cluding the financial sphere. Yet how far can these provisions 
be considered successful? 
Table 11,1 indicates the Sources of Funds position for 
Indian companies—private limited as well as public limited. 
For any enterprise the most important capital is one that forms 
its Shares and Debenture stock. Such capital can be raised by 
issuing appropriate securities. In India Preferred and Ordinary 
are the two types of shares which a company issues. Preference, 
issue has had a limited usage. One possible explanation is 
that it carries a fixed return and restricts thereby a par¬ 
ticipation in rising earnings of the company. Thus an investor 
in Preferred stock loses on both counts. In India Preferred 
stock carries a fixed rate of return which is not connected 
with the actual earnings of the company. Therefore he does 
not participate in the higher earnings of the company. Nor 
does he have the precedence, as with a Debenture holder, over 
the distribution of corporate assets. Table II.2 lists the 
consents granted by the Controller of Capital Issues during 
the years 1957-61. The maximum percentage raised through issue 
of Preference shares is 6.5 in 1957; lowest 2.2 in 1953. In 
the same table are given figures for Debenture issue. Absence 
of a strong debenture market has resulted in putting extra 
strain on other financial resources of Indian companies. In 
the light of the heavy contributions made by investing public 
to loans floated by Governments, Central, State as well as 
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TABLE II.1 
CORPORATE SECTOR: SOURCES OF FUNDS 
Source 
Public limited companies Frivate, limited cos. 
191+6-51 1951-55 1956-58 194-6-4-9 1956-57 
INTERNAL 31.75 59.68 36.40 26.46 33.68 
Depreciation 20.60 26.98 20.08 12.14 19.44 
Reserves-*- 11.15 32.71 16.32 14.32 17.24 
EXTERNAL 50.40 30.62 63.02 52.43 27.67 
Capital^ 23.95 6.52 10.62 28.16 6.33 
Borrowings 26.45 24.09 52.39 24.27 21.44 
Bank Borrowing 13.75 9.49 18.47 24.03 12.03 
Trade Dues neg. neg. neg. 12.14 33.87 
Miscellaneous 17.81 9.70 0.59 9*22 1.78 
■^Excludes capitalized reserves. 
2Includes capitalized reserves. 
Source: Compiled from: 
Government of India, MReport of the Taxation 
Enquiry Commission,” Vol. I, New Delhi, 1954-55. 
Reserve Bank of India, Monthly Bulletins for 
the months of Sept. 1957, Sept. I960. Bombay. 
********** 
TABLE II.2 
CAPITAL ISSUES CONSENTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 
YEAR ORDINARY PREFERRED D3BENTURKS LOANS TOTAL 
Rs. nr" Rs. Rs, % Rs. % Rs. V 
1957 87.2 57 9.9 6 9.1 6 47.1 31 153.3 100 
1958 373.8 88 9.5 2 18.5 4 21.2 5 423.0 100 
1959 145.8 72 11.4 6 9.9 5 36.4 18 203.5 100 
i960 211.5 73 8.4 3 19.6 7 50.1 17 289.6 100 
1961 
June 144.3 77 4.2 3 6.8 5 23.0 15 148.3 100 
AVERAGE 74 4 5 17 
Source: Daily Financial Express of January 25? 1962 
Data compiled by Mr. P. C. Jain. 
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local, the unpopularity of corporate debentures requires some 
justification. The Indian investor has always looked for a 
fair amount of security in his investments. When it is a 
choice between two investments, both offering equal return, 
he is likely to choose one that offers maximum security—the 
Government loans. Secondly the average investor has for long 
been suspicious about the activities carried on by the cor¬ 
porate sector and its ability to honor its pledges. It is 
interesting to note that the Tata Iron and Steel Company 
Limited, an Indian company that has relied on debentures for 
its long-term capital needs and has always made a success of 
its debenture issue, is a company of unquestioned integrity 
and unrivalled prestige in the country. The same cannot be 
said about other Indian companies which tried to float de¬ 
benture issue. Thirdly, it was customary for a debenture 
issue to be taken up by private interests? the landlords, the 
Princes and the general wealthy classes. In the independent 
India the emphasis was on a socialistic pattern of society. 
In accordance with this objective legislation was passed to 
abolish land estates. Similar legislation was passed increasing 
the level of taxation on wealthy classes. All the socialistic 
legislation had one singular effect in reducing the investing 
power of these classes. Since It became increasingly difficult 
to secure their support, any new issue of debentures became 
increasingly difficult. Finally, for reasons not sufficiently 
clear, the Indian money market—especially the banks—have been 
very reluctant in the past to have any commitments with such 
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firms as have floated debentures, Indian companies depend on 
banks for a large percentage of their loans. Yet 
according to the Central Banking Enquiry Committee, 
Indian companies which had issued debentures found it 
difficult to secure bank loans and cash credit on the 
usual terms. Perhaps some banks thought it was not 
safe to lend money to an undertaking which had already 
had such heavy debt charges.^ 
Another type of share that is issued sometimes in 
India is the Bonus share. Rising out of the capitalization 
of undistributed profits, this had been a very popular method 
with the Indian industries immediately after the second World 
War. During the quinquennium of 19^7, 60$ of the reserves and 
funds were capitalized. Table II.3 gives the industrywise 
distribution of bonus shares. However, 
it is interesting to note that the issue of Bonus 
share by capitalization of reserves was a temporary 
phenomenon in India and disappeared with the exhaustion 
of accumulated profits within seven years after the 
second world war.^ 
Two notes could be appended here. 
Bonus payments have to be made to avoid taxes or to 
obey legal compulsion. The Indian Income Tax act under 
Section 23*+ presumes 60$ of earned profits as distri¬ 
buted for tax purposes. In the event of default, (that 
is to say, if dividends are not distributed) tax 
authorities assume entire profits as distributed and 
levy taxes accordingly.^ 
An Indian company has to assume an enormous burden in such a 
case. It pays Income tax @ 30$ plus a Surcharge @ 5$. It 
pays a ration tax @ 20% and Wealth tax, which is related to 
Capital, @ £$ for companies that have capital assets exceed¬ 
ing Rs. 500,000. In case a dividend is paid out the company 
pays a dividend tax @10, 20 or 30$ on dividends exceeding 
TABLE IT.3 
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PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTI ON OF BONUS SHARES IN 
PAID UP CAPITAL OF SIX MAJOR INDUSTRIES AT 
THE END OF THE YEAR 1953-5^ 
Industry Total Total Total 2 as 3 as 
Paid Up Raised raised $ of % of 
Capital by Bonus 1 1 
shares 
1 2 3 k 51 & 
Cotton 
Textiles 5073 3222 1851 63 37 
Jute 
Textiles 2601 2012 539 77 23 
Sugar 1515 1260 255 33 17 
Coal 977 352 125 87 13 
Cement 2236 2075 211 90 10 
Iron and 
Steel 2522 1836 686 73 27 
Total 14974 112 57 3717 75 25 
Amounts are in Rs. hundred thousands. 
Source: S. S. Srinivasan, "Auto- financing” in Indian 
Journal of Economics, ?Iev Delhi. Pp. 187 • 
************ 
TABLE n.4 
BOOTS SHARES IN THE INDIAN CAPITAL MARKET 
Year Total Consent Total Bonus 5 as 
Consent for Bonus raised issue % Of 
shares raised b 
i 2 3 if 5 6 
1958 39.45 9.88 103.74 11.47 1.7 
1959 149.53 2.88 83.69 4.32 4.5 
I960 150.13 0.77 84.22 0.50 o.5 
Amounts are In Rs. ten million. 
Source: RBI Bulletin, Bombay, 1960-61. 
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6, 10 or 18# respectively on the face value of it. Thus a 
corporation would pay taxes to the tune of (30 ♦ 5 4 
20 41), As against this the tax on Bonus shares issued out 
of Reserves is calculated at a flat rate of 30#. 
There is a second inducement to issue of Bonus shares. 
The Bonus capital did not take the form of an addition 
of shares but in most cases the nominal value of partly 
paid share capital already issued was written down which 
reduced gap between nominal and paid up value of shares. 
(Ennhasis added. 
However, in spite of such attractions the actual issue of Bonus 
shares has not shown much promise. Thi3 is reflected in 
Table II.4. It Is seen therein that bonus issue has been 
negligible as a percentage of total issue floated and sub¬ 
scribed. This would have to be attributed to reluctance of 
the Government to let business get away without paying the 
higher percentage to taxes. Since no issue can be without a 
governmental sanction, the bonus shares have formed such a 
low percentage. The common stock thus emerges as the largest 
single type floated, averaging 87.5# of the total 3tock floated 
as is seen in Table II.2. 
Whatever the predominant type of share on the market, 
it is by and large the ownership of shares that determines 
the complexion of a corporate enterprise. Table II.5 gives the 
ownership breakdown of investment in shares. It can be seen 
that, numerically individuals rank highest. A differentiation 
Is made between salary earning individuals and non-salary 
earners. The former comprises the class on which the joint 
stock companies in western countries rely for stock investment. 
TABLE II.5 
INVESTMENT IN SHARES* 1958-59 
CATEGORY OF 
INVESTORS 
NUMBER OF 
NUMBER 
SHAREHOLDERS 
% 
DIVIDEND 
RUPEES 
INCOME 
% 
INDIVIDUALS 125,099 89 39.72 53 
Salary Earners 32,302 23 11.15 15 
Non-salary 
earners 92,797 66 28.57 38 
HINDU UNDIVIDED 
FAMILY .... 10,595 7 4.51 6 
UNREGISTERED FIRMS 
AND OTHER ASSCNS. 2,726 2 3.22 
REGISTERED FIRMS . 657 1 0.9“+ 1 
COMPANIES . 2,112 2 26.61> 35 
Divided Income in Rs. ten million. 
Source: "Eastern Economist"—"Special Budget Number" 
New Delhi, March 6, 1961. Pp. 697. 
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The other class Includes the wealthier sections of the com¬ 
munity. Though in absolute numbers, these sections might 
aopear as constituting a majority, the dividend figures reveal 
a different story. Since dividend earnings are dependent on 
the amount of stock held it appears that the corporate sector 
holds the largest number of stock in value. Their combined 
earnings constitute a proportion of 4l$ of the total dividends 
distributed. In India there is an absence of any organized 
Institutional contribution to corporate stock holding. This 
means that the corporate holding evident in Table II.5 repre¬ 
sents the inter-corporate investment prompted by a group- 
oriented investment policy. Such a holding has made it 
possible for companies to refrain from any undesired dividend 
distribution and build up reserves. Table II.6 indicates that 
the percentage of retained earnings to dividends distributed 
is 150%, while Table II.7 shows how companies in different 
industries have maintained high profit retention ratios. 
Besides the reserves created out of retained profits, 
depreciation contributes heavily as an internal source of 
funds, forming almost 55$ of the internal sources. Table II.8 
compares depreciation provisions allowed in different countries. 
It can be said, on the basis of this comparison, that the pro¬ 
visions for Indian Industries are quite favorable. In Table 
II.1, it was seen that depreciation forms 20$ of the total 
funds available to the public limited firms and 19.*+*+$ of the 
total funds available to the private limited firms. The 
liberal provisions for depreciation are attributable on the 
TABLE II.6 
DISTRIBUTION OF EARNINGS OF COMPANIES 
1958 
25 
1. Total Earnings ..•••••.. 
2. Depreciation Provision . . . . . 
3. Tax Provision 
4. Net Earnings 1 - (2 4 3) ... . 
5. Dividend distributed . 
6. Earnings retained . . . 
575 
129 
181 
26? Amounts are 
in Rs. 
163 ten million 
102 
Percentage of retained profits to 
net profits .*39 
Percentage of retained profits to dividends 
distributed (2.4.6. : 5).150 
Source: H. T. Parekh, "Future of Joint Stock 
Companies in India", Jaico, Bombay, 1958, Pp. 4l 
TABLE II.7 
NET PROFIT & PROFIT RETENTION RATES FOR 
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANIES 
Vi >51-55 1955-58 
Industry 
Net Profit 
as a % of 
Net worth 
; Retained 
Profits 
as a % 
Net profit Retained 
as a % of Profits 
Net worth as a % 
of net of net 
nrofit profit 
Cotton Textile 5.6 23.5 *+.3 - 7.8 
Iron & Steel 17.6 65.5 14.9 70.7 
Engineering 6.4 53.0 9.9 44.7 
Cement 11.0 39.3 8.8 27.3 
Sugar 10.0 41.3 9.1 32.5 
Source: Compiled from RBI Monthly Bulletin for 
Sept. 60. Bombay. 
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TABL2 II.8 
Comparative Statement shoving rate* of Depreciation allowed by the fiscal 
Authorities in India and other Foreign Countries 
India U.S. U.K. Australia Canada 
(A) (3) (C) (D) (X) 
Current rates on 
_W. D. V.__ 
I Bullding: - 
(1) First Class substantial 
buildings of selected 
materials.2.5$ 1.5$ •• 1$ 5$ 
(ii) Buildings of less 
substantial construction 5$ to 2$ 
(ill) Third class buildings 
of less substantial 
construction.7*5$ 3$ •• 3? 
(iv) Purely temporary wooden structure • renewals may be written off 
II Machinery Plant A Furniture:- 
General rate.7$ 20 years useful 2.5$ to 
(st. line) 10$ 5$ 
Jute.9$ 7i$ to 
10$ 
Special rates for Sugar works 
(Pollers in Sugar Works) 9$ 28 to 50 years 7.5$ 
(Heplacement) 
Chemical Works ...... .10$ 15 to 22 years 5$ 7«5$ 20$ 
to 15$ 
Cement Works using rotary 
kilns.10$ 20 to 25 years .. 7*5$ 
III Motor Cars:-.20$ 2 to 5 years ... 25$ 
IV Electrical Machinery:- 
(I) Batteries ....... 20$ .. •• •• •• 
(ii) Other Electrical machinery 
including generator switch 
gear and instruments, trans¬ 
formers etc.10$ 17 to 20 years .. 5$ 6$ 
20$ 
20$ 
Double these rates (or special rates) may be allowed for buildings used tn 
industries which cause special deterioration such as chemical works, 
soap and candle works, paper mills etc.etc. 
Botes 
(A) Pule 8 of Income Tax Pules under Income Tax Act 
(B) Unofficially from C. B. R. records 
(C) Tolley* 1 II III IVs Income Tax Manual 1955-56 
(D) "Schedule of rates of Depreciation" issued by Commissioner of Income 
Tax -18-1-1951. 
(X) "Taxation in Canada * by Bank of Montreal 
Source: HCA2R: "Replacement Costs in Industries", Ministry of Labour 
A Employment Book of India, Hew Delhi, I960, P. 69 
one hand to an absence of a clearly defined depreciation 
policy. The National Council of Applied Economic Research in 
New Delhi, which prepared a study of the replacement costs in 
Indian industries, found that depreciation practices are 
followed for reasons quite divergent. 
The depreciation formula followed by most of the 
companies is a fixed percentage of the written down 
value of an asset .... (However) our companies do 
not make any allowance for rising prices of machinery 
while estimating depreciation .... The replacement 
funds of our companies are often mixed up with the 
general reserve. Expenditures on expansion and modern¬ 
ization are mixed up with those on replacement proper 
.... Rates of depreciation charged by companies 
vary from 2-J-# to 10# in case of factory buildings and 
from 3# to 15# in case of plant and machinery. Such 
divergent rates on the same kind of asset in the same 
industry suggest that decisions of management con¬ 
cerning depreciation allowance are influenced by con¬ 
siderations which are not always purely economic 
.... The relation (between allowance for depre¬ 
ciation and actual expenditure) is further obscured 
by the fact that replacement funds are used within 
business as working capital, so that replacement, 
when due, has to be financed by loans or new issue.g 
Depreciation and reserves thus form a source of funds 
for Indian companies, which in case of public limited com¬ 
panies accounts for 36.4# of total funds and in case of 
private limited companies accounts for 33.68# to total 
funds. Inasmuch as depreciation and reserves are charges on 
the earnings of the companies ploughed back profits thus 
emerge as a major source of funds. 
Proportion of (such) financing amounted to 78# in 
raining industry. 49 Chemical firms reported it at 
62#. Roughly 3/4 of the resources invested at long 
term in 1142 companies were earned within the com¬ 
panies themselves. The ratio of self-financing in 
case of net investment in fixed assets was over 45#.^ 
A comparison of these rates with those obtained in 
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foreign countries will not show much imbalance. The difference, 
however, lies in the circumstances that make such provisions 
possible in India. The high percentage of reserves is not the 
result of any premeditated policy adhered to by corporate 
owners or managers. As shown in the discussions in Chapters 
III and V, other sources of finance are not available to Indian 
entrepreneurs. They have perforce to fall back on their own 
internal resources. That they are in a position to do so, is 
the result of a lopsided ownership position, which lets the 
company cut dividends and accumulate it as reserve. Even where 
dividends have been declared, as much as of this distributed 
dividend is returned to the interests that control the corpora¬ 
tion (as seen in Table II.5). If such stock-holding did not 
exist, it would have been impossible for the company to re¬ 
frain from distributing a large portion of the existing earn¬ 
ings, thus depleting contributions to the reserves. 
It should be therefore easy to understand how the high 
percentage of internal financing is possible for two reasons. 
First, a restriction of dividend is necessary to build up re¬ 
serves. Second, a group-oriented investment permits such 
restriction. Considered in the absence of any other source of 
funds, the position of the reserves indicates its own 
importance. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE BANKING COMPANIES IN INDIA AND 
THEIR PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRIAL 
FINANCING 
This chapter discusses the banking sector of industrial 
financing. Data is presented to show how the banks do 
not contribute to industrial financing of any long term 
nature. Their contribution is restricted to short term 
financing. 
It is shown how the banks do not take up any shares nor 
do they make any long term advances. The nature of their 
advances is such that their assistance is not necessarily 
available to growth industries. The advances made by them 
are made on hypothecation of goods that make it obvious 
that the requirements are nominal. The real criteria by 
which the banking operation is guided, is the age-old 
group principle. 
This has resulted in two developments. Groups have 
tended to have their own banking arrangements with a 
particular bank. Secondly, industries have had to look 
to other sources for finances. 
That the banks do not participate in industrial finan¬ 
cing in other countries also, has been shown. A model 
is also cited how the Indian banks could follow the 
trail blazed by the German banks. 
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30 Indigenous Bankers In India; 
If the term "Banking activity” is understood to mean 
the accepting of deposits, granting of loans at interest and 
discounting of trade bills, the origins of banking activity. 
This, however, is characterized by the essentially personalized 
tendencies in the operation. The so-called Houses which were 
engaged in this activity, depended upon the reputation of one 
person, usually the head of the family. The lending and dis¬ 
counting of commercial bills constituted the major portion of 
the business transacted by these houses. The funds for such 
an activity were derived from the profits of the commercial 
transactions of these houses. The fortunes of the banking 
activity were closely connected and directly affected by the 
commercial activity of these houses. 
Today this activity has continued unhindered, but 
tends to be identified with communities rather than indivi¬ 
duals. Thus, a reference may be found in the various Bank 
Enquiry Commissions reports, to the so-called "Indigenous 
Bankers", which are characterized by specific communities 
of SHROFFS, MARWARI or MTTLTANI communities in the Northern, 
Western, Eastern and Central India and of CH5TTIARS in South 
India. 
Different communities of Indigenous bankers are to be 
found in every part of the country. 
The type ranges from the small village capitalist to 
the wealthy, well established, private partnership, 
generally a family partnership, of merchant bankers. 
... A special type is that of the Chetty community in 
Madras, where there exists something approaching to 
joint responsibility to the community as a whole.^ 
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Indigenous banking is not organised on a joint stock basis. 
There is no share capital and liability is unlimited. An 
Indigenous banker allows his activities to extend to financing 
of agriculturists, local trade and arts* He may engage in trade 
himself and also may participate in the distribution of goods. 
He discounts hundies and lends money against gold, 
godds or personal security. He also buys bills on 
Government treasuries and when in need discounts them 
with the commercial banks in town. He pays higher 
rate of interest than the banks on any deposits he 
may receive^ 
The chief instrument of business financing by these bankers is 
the HUNDI. A ITTNDI is a negotiable instrument, coming very 
close to its sophisticated counterpart, the Bill of Exchange. 
A HUNDI transaction can take many forms. It could be a 
DARSHANI HUNDI, (a bill of usance payable on its presentation) 
or it can be a MUDDATI HUNDI (payable after a certain period 
of time). This period may vary from 11 to 361 days. There is 
a customary provision of three to five days of grace in case 
the maturity period is more than eleven days, A HUNDI can 
also be a PHANIJOG, payable to the payee only, or SHAHJOG. 
payable to any respectable banker or merchant house. In the 
latter case, the burden of responsibility of checking into 
the credit standing and the authenticity-status of the payer 
and the payee falls on the banker cashing such a HUNDI. A 
HUNDI may also have the features of a bank check—it can be 
DEKHANDHAR. payable to bearer, or it can be FTKHANJOG, payable 
to order. A HUNDI can be a purely financial bill, drawn by 
one party in need of cash; or it can be a trade bill drawn 
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against produce or goods. The negotiable nature of the 
HUNDI makes it possible to discount and rediscount it until 
maturity is attained. 
It is not difficult to see that the indigenous banker 
has special position in the Indian money market. Table III.l 
cites the percentage-wise contribution of different agencies 
to the agricultural sector of the economy. The fact that may 
need explanation is that between themselves the agricultural 
TABLE III.l 
CONTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENT AGENCIES TO 
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT 
Credit Agency Proportion of total 
borrowing 
ORGANIZED SECTOR 
Government.  . 3.3 
Cooperatives . 3.1 
Commercial Banks .. 0.9 
INDIGENOUS SECTOR 
Relatives .•••••••••.. 14.2 
Landlord 1.5 
Agricultural money lender* • • • • 24.9 
Professional money lender. .... 44.8 
Traders and Commission Agents. • • 5*5 
nthpi'Q i ft 
SourceT ""RESERVE' 'MTWTWt'k MLetTTT ~ 
beeember 195^, Bombay. 
money lender and the professional money lender contribute 
69.7# of the total rural credit. It would also be desirable 
to divide the category “Relatives”, since among the "Relatives” 
there would be people who would qualify as professional money 
lenders. Therefore, somewhere near three-fourths of the 
total rural credit is obtained from the Indigenous bankers, 
comprising chiefly of Agricultural money lender and 
Professional money lenders; while the Organized sector, com¬ 
prising of Government, Cooperatives and commercial banks, 
contributed only one-fourth. 
The Indigenous Bankers* advances to the industrial 
and commercial sectors are no less conspicuous, however, 
these are restrictive in scope. Because of the essential 
nature of their banking transactions, their business is 
restricted to a particular class. Industries that are under¬ 
capitalized and have no other regular source of capital avail 
able to them have had to resort to this type of financing. 
For these companies, the conventional methods of either 
deposit financing (because of absence of reputation) or 
of internal resources (because of absence of financial 
strength) are not available. Another class of companies 
depending on these bankers is the one which is not as yet 
acclimated to the systematized procedures of a joint stock 
bank. The indigenous banker relies on his personal knowledge 
acumen and judgment, often requiring of his client nothing 
more than a personal bond. If satisfied with his client’s 
integrity he could even waive the necessity of a security or 
hypothecation of property. 
The price of this personal procedure unhindered by 
any of the organized markets* drawbacks is the high rate of 
interest which the debtor has to pay. Under natural circum¬ 
stances, backed by good security, this rate would vary be¬ 
tween 7 to 9 per cent. However, it is quite possible to 
come across a transaction which involves payment of interest 
at 75 to 125 per cent—such a transaction would involve grave 
3*+ 
risks under which the loan has been advanced. The Indian 
Central Banking Enquiry Committee revealed that Coal com¬ 
panies paid a rate between 12 and 18 per cent while the new 
industries like Paper, Sugar, Tanneries etc., paid a rate be¬ 
tween 15 to 20 per cent. The risk in these cases resulted 
from the fact that these were all new industries and required 
venture capital. 
Modernization of Indigenous Bankers: 
Attempts have been made on more than one occasion to 
bring this unorganized sector into the fold of the organized 
money market. Indigenous Bankers* insistence on relying on 
their own resources and their reluctance to maintain deposits 
or balances with either the joint stock banks or the State 
Bank of India makes it difficult for the latter to put them 
on approved lists. It Is quite customary for an indigenous 
banker to ask for and receive accommodation from joint stock 
banks, but this will be most likely restricted to discounting 
of HUNDIS drawn by the Indigenous banker. There is an under¬ 
standable preference in such transactions for HUNDIS that are 
trade HUNDIS backed by a bona-fide sale of commodities over 
purely financial HUNDIS. 
Efforts on part of the Government toward integration 
include emphasis on streamlining the working of the indigenous 
bankers. Many recommendations have been made by the Reserve 
Bank of India. The way the indigenous bankers mixed banking 
and non-banking activities has always lent a certain instability 
to their operations. As explained earlier, the ups and downs 
of the non-banking activities, trade agriculture, etc., affected 
their banking activity directly. To neutralize their banking 
activity from these effects, the Indigenous bankers were asked 
to confine their activities to banking only; at the cost of 
their other activities. Further, they were asked to maintain 
a minimum statutory working balance of Rs. 200,000.00 (this 
minimum to be increased to five hundred thousand later). More 
important from the point of view of the Reserve Bank of India 
were their recommendations whereby (1) the indigenous bankers 
would have had to reveal the names of the partners and other 
parties with whom they deal, (2) a complete regularization of 
the method of keeping accounts and books of account and exam¬ 
ination and auditing of these books by a recognized auditor. 
The indigenous bankers havo shown their unwillingness to any 
change that will co3t them their individuality and business 
secrecy. As a result the unorganized sector of the Indian 
money market has maintained its own identity in the money 
market and not merged with or linked in any way with the other 
organized sectors. 
The need for some sort of a liaison between the or¬ 
ganized and unorganized sectors Is filled by the various 
types of brokers, who specialize in this type of work. These 
brokers may combine more than one nature of brokeraget 
foreign exchange, deposit, loan and share; or they may 
restrict themselves only to deposit brokerage. "Deposit 
brokerage” is a service which the brokers perform on behalf 
of a bank in attracting deposits at the bank from different 
sources—Individual or corporate. In other words, the broker 
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may act as a scout for the bank. His personal integrity and 
position indirectly gives reassurance of the position of the 
bank he is representing. A broker would facilitate inter¬ 
bank lending and have the surplus cash from business houses 
and/or individuals of consequence placed with the bank. They 
may be instrumental in getting the joint and several loans 
renewed or the HTTIfDIS of indigenous bankers rediscounted. 
The latter transaction involves a four parties transaction: 
the merchant who originates the HUNDI. discounted by the 
indigenous banker in the first instance is handed over to 
the broker who gets it re-discounted at a bank on his personal 
guarantee. The advice and information of these brokers may 
be sought with regard to the credit worthiness of a party. 
JOINT STOCK BANKING Iff IffPIA; 
The development of joint stock banicing in India dates 
to the last century when the three Presidency banks of Bengal, 
Bombay and Madras were started. The Imperial Bank of India 
(IBI) formed in 1921 by an amalgamation of these three banks, 
served as the central bank of India till 1935 at which time 
a special act brought into existence India’s central bank, 
the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The Imperial Bank returned 
to purely commercial activities and till 1955 was next to the 
Reserve Bank in influencing the money market in India. However, 
in that year the Imperial Bank was nationalized and turned 
into the State Bank of India (SBI). 
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Role of Imperial Bank and State Bank In Industrial Financing: 
Till its nationalization, the investment policy of the 
Imperial Bank was influenced by, but not subjected to, govern¬ 
mental directives. It was however, strictly Gilt-edge-oriented, 
Thus, while the Deposit to Investment ratio never varied beyond 
45# to 55$, the investment in government securities con¬ 
stituted the major portion. As is evident from Table III,2, 
the investments, or rather, the amounts available for invest¬ 
ing in the industries are almost negligible in 1947 and 
relatively less in later years. It can be said that the 
TABLE III.2 
INVESTMENTS OF THE IMPERIAL .BANK OF INDIA 
IN GOVERNMENTAL SECURITIES: 19*+7-54 
YEAR 1947 19^9 1951 1952 1953 1954 
INVESTMENT* 94.71 90.47 80.94 82.90 85.98 87.33 
’►The figures for Investment refer to the ratio of 
government securities as a percentage of the total investment. 
Imperial Bank did not have any long-term investments and to 
that extent the long-term investment portfolios were deprived 
of the support and attention they deserved. 
One more way the Imperial Bank could influence indus¬ 
trial finance was by increasing or decreasing the bank rate 
and the HUNDI discount rate. Coupled with the loans and 
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advance policy of the bank, this could have worked effectively, 
influencing the availability of credit and working capital. 
However, the peculiar relationship the Imperial Bank had had 
with the Government of India may have been an obstacle to 
accomplish this. Since any change in the rate or in the loan 
policy tended to have an effect on the entire banking world 
as well as the economy as a whole, it was natural that a 
very conservative policy should be adopted by the Imperial 
Bank. 
After nationalization, in addition to being the 
successor to the Imperial Bank, the State Bank became a signal 
force in the Indian money market on its own merits. It is 
the largest single commercial bank with deposits, in 1961, 
amounting to about one-third of the other bank deposits 
in the country (see Table III.3). It operates with the 
largest number of branches carrying on diversified and varied 
business, serving industry trade and agriculture. The State 
Bank was established as a 
strong integrated state-partnered commercial banking 
institution with an effective machinery of branches 
spread over the whole country for stimulating banking 
development for providing vastly extended remittance 
facilities for cooperative and other banks, following 
a policy which would be in effective consonance with 
national policies adopted by the Government without 
departing from the cannons of sound business.-^ 
There is, therefore, an understandable restriction on the bank 
not to let the number of private shareholders increase beyond 
45$. Its board of directors is appointed in part directly by 
the Government of India and in part with consultation with 
other Governmental agencies, with the exception of six directors 
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which are elected to represent the private interests. Essen¬ 
tially a government operated institution, the State Bank depends 
heavily on the business generated by directives issued and 
policies adopted by the government. The State Bank acts as the 
Government representative in managing currency chests and 
handling receipts and payment on government authorities' 
accounts, quasi public funds arising out of funds for minors, 
liquidators, local government authorities and court deposits. 
Business is indirectly generated by the provisions under 
Section 2b of the Banking Companies Act which prescribes the 
minimum assets to be maintained by the banking companies. 
This section permits the balances of the banking companies 
with the State Bank to be treated as cash. 
With the nationalization of the State Bank the whole 
outlook towards investments, short as well as long term, 
changed. The chief task of the newly nationalized State Bank 
was two-fold: (1) increasing bank consciousness among the 
people by opening new branches; (2) development of rural and 
agricultural credit in the country. The policy of the Govern¬ 
ment of India, was overwhelmingly oriented in favor of the 
establishment and progress of cooperative institutions and 
of assisting the growth of small-scale industries. This re¬ 
sulted in some amount of negligence concerning the needs of 
the organized large firms in industries. 
COMMERCIAL BAKKS AND LONG TERM INVESTMENT FINANCING: 
The Indian commercial banks have two major classifica¬ 
tions: Scheduled and Unscheduled. A bank having an aggregate 
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value of paid up capital and reserves of Rs. 500,000.00 or 
more and depositing at least five percent of their demand and 
two percent of their time liabilities with the Reserve Bank 
are listed as such in the Second Schedule of the Reserve Bank 
of India Act and derive the classification therefrom of being 
a Scheduled bank. An unscheduled bank by contrast does not 
conform to these requirements. 
That the banks as a principal financial intermediary 
should play a very significant role in the industrialization 
of the country by mobilizing funds from the community and 
channeling them towards productive investment, needs no 
repetition. Nor does the fact that Indian banks play an in¬ 
significant role. 
Table III.3 gives a very good indication of this. 
The total owned funds to deposits ratio is at 1:4. Their 
cash reserves are higher than the sum of the bills purchased 
and bills discounted. Out of a total of over sixteen billion 
rupees of available working capital, their investments amounted 
to a little over five billion rupees, while their loans and 
advances amounted to eight billion rupees, the latter forming 
97$ of the total credit advanced. Since this shows clearly 
where the bias of banking companies rests it may be expedient 
to analyze further their investment portfolios. 
Table III.4 shows the progress of the investment pattern 
through the years 195C-1956. One striking point to be noticed 
is the rigidity of figures in important categories. It should 
be remembered that it was this period that covered the operation 
TABLE III.4 
ANALYSIS OF THE INVESTMENT PATTERN OF 
SCHEDULED BANKS 
Type of 
Investment 
1950 1954 1955 1956 
Govt. Securities 366.0 357.5 396.1 377.7 
Trust Securities 7*1 10.8 13.8 15.5 
Fixed deposits 0.4 3.5 3A 3.3 
Shares and deben. 
of Jt.St.Cos. 14.4 11.2 11.8 11.2 
Real Estate 5.8 6.5 6.8 6.8 
Bullion — 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Others 0.6 0.35 0.39 0.14 
Foreign Investment 21.7 23.8 21.2 26.4 
Amounts are in Rs. 
millions 
ten 
Source* S. R. K. Rao, The Indian Money Market. 
Charibanga Publishing House, Allahabad, i95>9j P. 21. 
of India*s first Five Year Plan leading to more than satisfac¬ 
tory development on many sides. Income rose 18$, industrial 
output ratio increased from 100 in 19?1 to 132.6 in 1956. The 
real investment of banks, shares and debentures, does not in¬ 
crease in proportion beyond 3# of the total investment. Even 
if the category, Fixed Deposits is taken as a long term invest¬ 
ment made by the banks, this total fails to increase beyond 
3.5#. 
This apparent lack of interest in corporate industrial 
investment prompts the assertion that the operations of the 
commercial banks in the long term capital market are confined 
to the purchase and sale of government and other trustee 
securities. This reluctance has been attributed to many causes. 
The expansion of the banking activity received impetus 
during the second world war. The surpluses, earned and re¬ 
ceived, which, under normal circumstances, would have been 
diverted to industrial investments, were invested in govern¬ 
ment securities. As time passed, this reliance on the invest¬ 
ment in the Gilt-edged market became a set feature of commer¬ 
cial banking operation. Government securities are next to 
cash in liquidity. The Indian banker has always had to keep 
himself prepared for a possible run on the bank. This accounts 
for not only the high cash ratios maintained but also for the 
high percentage of Governmental security investment. A Reserve 
Bank report states 
next to cash and balance with banks, Treasury bills 
rank as a highly liquid asset which also yields an 
adequate return and can be converted into cash almost 
instantaneously. For this reason they occupy an 
important place (in the banker*s portfolio).^ 
The return aspect of the industrial securities should not be 
overlooked. Industrial firms in Indi§ have had a very dis¬ 
couraging record with regard to dividends and returns. Com¬ 
panies like Hindustan Motors Limited did not pay any dividend 
for periods as long as thirteen years. When Indian Cable 
Company decided to pay a dividend commensurate with its earn¬ 
ings that year (which would have compensated in some measure 
for the absence of any dividend whatsoever over the past 20 
years) the Governmental regulation of dividends, which limits 
non-taxable dividend to 6$, hindered the distribution of 
dividends. (These by no means are isolated instances. For 
a tabulated information regarding the nonpayment of dividends, 
see Table A.l in Appendix I.) 
Under such circumstances, it is understandable that 
the banking companies should be reluctant to lock up their 
funds for any appreciable time without a guarantee either of 
a fair return or of a speedy resale. 
Another explanation of this line of policy adopted by 
the Indian banks emphasizes the "Heritage" point of view. It 
is pointed out that In the matters of working principles, the 
Indian banks have been modeling themselves on British lines. 
It is well known that 
the British banks consider that their proper function 
is the provision of current finances for industry. Short 
loans in the form of an overdraft or in the form of a 
separate loan account have been readily granted. But 
it has never been their policy to furnish permanent 
funds. They are reluctant to lock up their funds.^ 
4? 
Another statement contends that 
the practice of joint stock banks in India with regard 
to industrial finance, is based largely on the British 
tradition of commercial banking, under which banks as 
a rule provide only the working capital requirements of 
the industries on the security of floating assets and 
eschew long term advances against fixed assets.^ 
In other words, the Indian banks are governed by 
Real Bills Doctrine (which maintains that commercial 
banks should make only short term self liquidating 
productive loans.^ 
It could be argued that limited assistance by banks 
is a feature found in countries other than India. Examples 
could be cited from American banks* investment and loan 
policies. In Table III.5, it is noticed that the commercial 
banks do not have enough stock holding to qualify for a 
separate listing. A separate table, Table III.6 indicates 
that the total corporate bond holding in i960 was 1.3# of the 
total bonds outstanding. These figures compare very favorably 
with those obtained for Indian banks. However, active partic¬ 
ipation by banks should not be considered a novel feature of 
banking business. 
In Germany it has been found that the banks take a 
very active part not only in promoting new concerns but also 
managing needs for all long terra finances of these industries. 
When a question arose of promoting a new concern, the Bank 
would prepare a preliminary survey and decide the kind of 
securities to be offered on the market. It was common for 
these Banks to buy up all the securities thus offered and 
hold on to them till such time when these were offered on the 
TABLE III.? 
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CORPORATE STOCK: AMOUNTS OUTSTANDING 
(In billions of dollars) 
19W 1950 1952 1956 1958 I960 
Market Value . . . . 111.0 146.0 186.0 338.0 418.0 442.0 
Consumer and non 
Profit. . . . 102.4 133.7 169.4 306.3 376.9 391.5 
Savings Institutions .2 .2 ,3 .7 
» 
.9 .8 
Insurance. 3.9 6.5 8.6 15.4 19.7 24.7 
Open end investment 
companies • 1.0 2.0 3.3 7.9 11.7 14.8 
Brokers & Dealers .8 .7 .7 .7 .6 .6 
Source: Board of Governors. FRS, Flow of Funds 
1946-60, Supplement 5, December 1961. p. w. 
TABLE III.6 
COMMERCIAL BANKS CONTRIBUTION TO BONDS 1 IN U.S • 
■ 1946 1950 1954 1956 1958 I960 
BONDS OUTSTANDING 24.7 35.7 50.1 56.4 68.4 74.9 
Taken up by the 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 2.2 2.2 1 .9 1.3 1.3 1.0 
Source: Ibid.. P. 89* 
*+7 
market to different investors. Thus the Bank became the party 
offering these shares on the market. With its own prestige 
to back it up (support to be valued) it was not difficult to 
have them subscribed them to. This operation was done by a 
single bank or by a consortium of many banks. It was also 
customary for the banks to take up as an investment a 
sizable portion of the stock offered. The bank in such 
activities served two interests. On the one hand, the 
expertize in the field of company promotion and stock float¬ 
ation accumulated by these banks was made available to the 
new entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs benefited from this 
system since they were assured of capital. On the other 
hand, the very fact that these banks were prepared to back 
the venture and subscribe to the capital issue, was a 
guarantee enough for the general investor. 
Another feature of the bank assistance in the field 
of industrial finance, was the system of current accounts main¬ 
tained by the firms. The basic principle employed was simple. 
In a current account relationship (which is different from a 
checking account transaction) between two parties, claims 
arise on both sides. 
These claims were not settled individually but were 
treated as items in an account of which the balance 
was struck periodically.g 
Advantages out of this system were two-fold: 
The average German firm depended to a remarkable 
extent on this arrangement not only for its working 
funds but also for the purpose of extending its 
permanent assets in anticipation of recourse to the 
investment market. 
7 
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From the banker’s point of view 
it was a continuous (and important) connexion and 
thus gave the bank an insight into most of the money 
transactions of a customer; it also provided much of 
the data required for estimating the risk involved in 
the intermittent capital transactions; and it led up 
to capital transactions even more directly, in the 
sense that improvements and extensions of plant were 
often undertaken by means of current account credit 
which was repaid later with the proceeds of a capital 
issue.10 
Lending Practices of Commercial Banks? 
In spite of these precedents, Indian banks prefer to 
follow their own procedures. Tables 111.7* III.8 and III.9 
show the industry-wise Sources of Funds over three periods. 
A correlative analysis of the percentage of bank loans to 
total sources of funds and rates of growth is found in Table 
III.10. The results obtained indicate that industrial growth 
had no relation to bank loans. Bank loans did not flow to the 
rapidly growing industries. If in the analysis a positive 
correlation was found, it could have been surmised that in¬ 
dustries using a high percentage of bank loans to total 
sources of funds achieved rapid growth through bank loans. 
Table III.10 indicates that there was no such positive corre¬ 
lation evident. This means that industries that were new 
and "growth” industries did not require or receive assistance 
from the banks. In other words, it was the old established 
industries that depended on the banks for their finances. 
What then influenced the bank decision was not the intrinsic 
value of a firm, but the intangibles like the prestige of a 
firm, and the prestige and influence of those associated with 
that firm. This is so, because the prestige, power and 
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TABLE III.10 
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANIES: PERCENT BANK LOANS TO 
TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS AND RATES OF GROWTH 
CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
Variable 1946/?1 1951/55 1955/58 
• 
r 1.2 -0.0549 -0.3846 -0.1209 
r 1.3 -0.1429 -0.2747 -0.0330 
r 1.4 -0.0549 -0.2088 -0.0330 
1 - Bank loans as percentages of total funds* 
2 - Annual compound rate of growth of net total assets 
during the period. 
3 - Annual compound rate of growth of inventories during 
the period. 
h - Annual compound rate of growth of net fixed assets 
during the period.' 
r - 2R - 1 
n/2(n-l) 
rs correlation coefficient ns number of ranks (14) 
R: computed by standard method according to 
G. H. Yule et al.« Introduction to vthe Theory of 
Statistics. Charles Griffen cl Co., Ltd., 19$0 
London. Pp. 253-309. 
Source: B. B. Patel, Commercial Banks1 Lending 
Practices in India. Unpublished Management Thesis, I961 
k.I.T., Boston7 Pp. 25. 
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influence of those associated with the firm is inalienable 
from that of the firm itself. Other factors lead to the same 
result. 
A set of tables is introduced here. Table III.11 
lists the growth of advances by the sector: herein the 
computed growth in advances to industry is the largest, 68.71$ 
over the decade. A partial detail in actual figures (Table 
III.12) shows a trend in absolute money terms and in percentage 
figures for industrial advances to increase at the expense 
of its closest rival, Trade and Commerce. Table III.13 lists 
computed increase or decrease in the bank advances to dif¬ 
ferent sectors, with Engineering and Cotton Textiles ben- 
efitting most. A breakdown into actual figures in Table TII.14 
shows what percentage these advances formed of the total 
working capital needs of different industries. Except for 
two industries, Iron & Steel and Cement, there can be 
noticed a very high percentage of bank advances in the total 
working capital needs. Engineering industries absorbed the 
highest percentage of 56.7$* (The reasons for Iron and Steel 
and Cement industry needing so much less capital would have 
to be sought elsewhere. Iron and Steel is the only industry 
which has successfully floated debenture issue in India. It 
is a closed group with no outside competition—the Indian 
Iron and Steel Company Limited managed by Martin Burn Limited 
and the Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited managed by Tatas 
form over 90$ of the production in the country. In a similar 
fashion the Cement industry could be considered a closed one, 
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TABLE III.13 
SECTORWISE DISTRIBUTION OF BANK ADVANCES 
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Sector 
June n  June v6 June 57 June 58 Amount s Amount $5 Amount %s Amount ?s 
Industry 24-1.2 38 .6 300.4 ?9.0 390.4 42.2 441.9 45.3 
Commerce 292.3 46 .7 356.3 46.7 414.3 44.8 412.9 42.6 
Agriculture 12.5 2 .0 17.7 2.3 22.9 2.5 18.5 1.9 
Personal & 
Professional 54.8 8 .8 58.2 7.6 61.1 6.6 64.0 6.6 
All others 24.9. 4 .0 31.3 4,1 .36.3 .3.9. 37.3 3.8 
Total 625.6 100 .0 763.9 100. < 3 925.0 100.0 974.6 100.0 
Amounts are all in 00,000s. 
Sources Dr. C 
of Industries in India 
. B. Mamoria. "Organisation and Finances 
," Kitab Mahal, Bombay, i960. Pp. 573* 
SHARE OF 
TABLE III.14 
BANK ADVANCES IN WORKING CAPITAL NEEDS 
Industry Working capital Banking Advance $$ 
Cotton Textile 157.4 61.0 38.7 
Jute 33.9 13.4 39.5 
Iron <$c Steel 34.3 5.9 17.2 
Engineering 39.3 22.3 56.7 
Cement 8.8 1.2 13.6 
Sugar 46.9 13.5 28.9 
Chemicals 24.4 9.2 37.7 
Sources Ibid.. Pp. 573• 
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the Associated Cement companies and the Dalmia-Jain group 
forming the overwhelmingly dominant interests.) 
Two important inferences with regard to the participa¬ 
tion of banks in industrial financing could be drawn. (1) The 
long term investment of banks is only 3.5$ of its total invest¬ 
ment and its contribution could thus be considered negligible. 
(2) Banks are contributing an increasing amount by making 
available credit to the extent of 45,3% of its total advances 
to the working capital requirement of the industries; this 
contribution amounted from 56.7$ (highest) to 28.9$ (lowest). 
These advances could have been made against a security cr 
without. Two tables are referred to here. Table II1.15 
cites the security requirement on banks* advances. When 
taken together, the three heads—Raw Materials, Finished 
goods and Stock and Trade, constitute 47$ of the total advance. 
Fixed Assets, Land and Buildings and Plant and Equipment 
form only 6$ of the advances, while Government securities 
and shares form not more than 8$ of the advance. A survey 
over the decade is cited in Table III.16. In case of an 
industry like Cotton Textiles, the Industrial Raw material 
would be an agricultural product. Allowing for such over¬ 
lapping and taking into consideration these, it can be seen 
that the category "Industrial Raw Material1’ has increased by 
51$. It can be deduced from this that for the purpose of 
granting loans and advances, Inventory forms the biggest 
security a company can give. Real Estate has declined over 
the years while assets of industrial concerns and shares of 
companies form only 12$ of the total advance. 
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TABLE III.I? 
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ON OUTSTANDING BANK LOANS 
TO MEDIUM AND SMALL SCALE BUSINESS 
(Percentages) 
Type of Security Corporate Non Corporate Total 
Documentary Bills 11 10 11 
Land and Buildings 3 6 5 
Plant and Equipment 2 1 1 
* 
Raw Material 7 3 
* 
4 
Finished Goods 11 2 4 
Stock and Trade 32 41 39 
* 
Gov*t Sec. and Shares 8 8 
* 
8 
Fixed Deposits 1 4 2 
Jewelry - 2 1 
Composite Advances 5 3 3 
Miscellaneous 1 2 2 
Total secured loans 82 80 81 
Unsecured loans 18 20 19 
Total loans Rs. 540,700 Rs. 2,027,700 Rs. 2,568,400 
Source: B. B. Patel, "Commercial Banks *.Lending 
Practices In India". Unpublished Management Thesis, 1961, 
M.t.T., Boston, Pp. 93• 
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Put differently this would mean that inventory figures 
as the greatest security for the company. Since inventory is 
a fluid security, (as contrasted with static security like 
buildings, plant and machinery) price fluctuations either for 
the raw materials or for the finished products can change the 
intrinsic hypothecable value of the inventory. This would make 
it difficult for the bank, or for that matter any lender that 
has accepted inventory as security, to redeem or recover the 
original loan. The expenses involved in this recovery are 
also a major consideration. Since the hypothecable value of 
the inventory is thus a potential hazard, this requirement of 
security becomes a mere matter of formality. The factor 
dominant in influencing the decisions of the bank has to be 
sought elsewhere. It is here that the nersonal guarantee 
and the personal influence that emerges as the prime lever. 
One indication of this is the prevalence of practices like 
the Two Name papers. 
For an industrial concern that is seeking accommoda¬ 
tion for a long-or medium-term loan on the basis of its own 
reputation without or with hypothecation of assets, the banks 
insisted that the papers be endorsed by a second signatory— 
this second signatory standing security and surety to the 
ft 
entire transaction thus lending the prestige of his name to 
the deal. 
The distinguishing feature of this system is the 
dependence on the personal guarantee of a third party, 
presumably unconnected with the company applying for the loan. 
Since it Is quite possible that in the absence of such a 
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guarantee the company may fail to secure the loan, the im¬ 
portance of this guarantee cannot be minimized. 
There are other methods in practice, which could be 
justified only on the grounds that they originate in bonds of 
mutual faith and trust backed by personal guarantees of the 
entrepreneurs. According to one such method, once delivery 
of goods has been accepted the invoices drawn by the company 
on the company on the customer are submitted to the bank. On 
the strength of the invoice advance is granted to the company 
up to a maximum of 80$ of the amount involved in the invoice. 
This advance is of a nature of an overdraft, since the advance 
is automatically terminated once the accounts between the 
company and its customer are settled. 
Another version of this would involve execution of 
a power of attorney by the company in favor of the bank, 
authorizing the bank to collect all the dues arising out of 
bona-fide sales by the company. Because of the power of 
attorney, it is possible for the bank to grant liberal advances. 
It would be extremely difficult to classify the ad¬ 
vances made and the methods used for these advances. These 
are not simple security backed advances, since there is no 
hypothecation involved. These are not HUNDIS or Bills of 
Exchange. At best these could be described as accommodations 
granted by the bank to the company, because the company could 
muster enough prestige and influence to back its demands up. 
As cited earlier in the discussion, until the estab¬ 
lishment of the Reserve Bank of India there was no central 
authority on the financial or monetary matters. In 19^9* the 
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Reserve Bank was nationalized and became the source of strength, 
guidance and directive for financial and banking sectors of 
Indian economy. The Banking Companies Act of 19^9 and sub¬ 
sequent amendments to it greatly increased the powers of the 
Reserve Bank viz-a-viz the banks in India. The banks have to 
possess a license from the Reserve Bank which may be cancelled 
if the Reserve Bank Is of the opinion that the affairs of the 
bank are conducted in a manner which is detrimental to the 
depositors. It is necessary for every bank to submit a re¬ 
turn giving full details of all the unsecured loans and 
advances granted to the companies in which either it has, or 
Its directors have, interests. A baric may be prevented, by 
an injunction from the Reserve Bank, from granting advances 
and loans which are not good business. A complete statement 
giving all the details, classifying advances and Investments 
in respect to Industry, Commerce and agriculture, has to be 
filed with the Reserve Bank. The affairs of a bank may be 
investigated and can be asked to close down if sc desired. 
Exacting as these restrictions may sound it should be remem¬ 
bered that these have been necessitated by the many mal¬ 
practices in grants of loans and advances as well as invest¬ 
ments resulting in bank crises. In India, it was recognized 
early that a bank is a valuable asset for any individual 
industrial group. Thus banks were started with aid from 
that group. The House of Tatas became aligned with the Central 
Bank of India and the Bank of India. The House of Birlas 
depended on the United Commercial Eank. The House of 
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Dalmia-Jains on the Punjab National Bank, Though these 
groups cannot be held responsible for all the malpractices 
(like unsecured advances from the banks to concerns under 
their management; unsecured advances to the directors; grant 
of loans and advances by the banks on its own shares and so 
on), they should be given credit for the idea of a group 
oriented bank; an idea which in less scrupulous hands re¬ 
sulted in disasters. The Two Name paper represents a well 
intentioned precautionary measure which was mishandled and 
allowed to fall into a cliche and ultimately used to selfish 
ends. For example, one way to ensure that the second 
signatory in the Two Name paper is worthy of trust and con¬ 
fidence was to insist that he be not connected with the 
debtor firm in any form of general partnership. Thus the 
Managing Agent of a firm automatically became the prime 
candidate for the second signature. Coupled with the prestige 
of the Managing Agents this practice of Managing Agent 
guaranteeing the promissory notes of their own managed 
concerns led to virtual abandonment of the cautionary zeal. 
In this way the curious interdependence between the Managing 
Agents and their banks was formed, a relationship which 
prompted Dr. C. Jeidel, the German banking expert, to remark 
before the Central Banking Enquiry Committee that the banks 
are spoiled by the managing agents and the managing agents 
are spoiled by the banks. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE MANAGING AGENCY SYSTEM 
An analysis is presented how this system of industrial 
organization, unique to India only, has come into being. 
Its nature and operation are discussed. 
The financial contribution of this system is of much 
greater significance in the present context and attention 
has been given to explain the diverse modes how this 
system organizes for industrial finances. 
The importance of the system in the present day India 
has been discussed and far reaching influence of the 
system has been presented. 
The fact that the managing agencies are typical examples 
of family oriented group minded philosophy is presented 
leading to observation how the groups, through the 
system, control vast sectors of the economy. 
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Historical Background; 
The managing agency system is peculiar to India. One 
may trace the origin of the system to the state of vacuum 
created by the abolition, around the middle of the last century, 
of the monopoly of trade which the Bast India Company had in 
India. This presented a valuable opportunity and a dour 
challenge to the enterprising group of traders and businessmen 
which at that time was composed chiefly of British elements. 
No one could fail to be attracted by the market potential of 
India's vast population—the biggest single market served 
exclusively by British businessmen. India lacked all the 
requirements basic for an emergence of any industrialization. 
The class of entrepreneurs was non-existent. Venture capital 
was not available. Agriculture, Land and Heal Estate were 
the accepted outlets for investment. Therefore capital was 
not forthcoming readily for industrial and/or commercial 
investment. Finally, even if financiers to back industrial 
investments and entrepreneurs to run the ventures could be 
found, technical skills and know how were altogether absents 
At that time India had not progressed beyond the restrictions 
imposed by the Middle Age technology. 
At this point the managing agency assumed responsi¬ 
bility for providing India what she could not have herself. 
The Charter of 1833 was resuonsible for the encouragement, 
which, among other concessions, recognized the right of non- 
Indians (which in this context could ap^ly only to the British) 
to own land in India. Advantage was promptly taken of this 
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provision to tap the natural resources of India and the first 
plantations and coal mines were established. 
For a number of reasons the development was restricted 
in the initial stages only to the British enterprising elements. 
Chief among these was the ease with which the British entrepre¬ 
neurs found it possible to import capital into India. It was 
thus the joint effort of 3ritish capital and entrepreneurial 
ability that resulted in the establishment of important Jute, 
Plantation and mining industry. 
The purely Indian type of managing agency did not 
appear till the beginning of the Civil War in the U.S. The 
Cotton textile industry in Great Britain was getting its cotton 
from the plantations on the southern states in the U.S. In 
the early sixties, the British industry was suddenly cut from 
this source of supply and had to look out for different sources. 
One such source was found in India. The windfall profits, 
which the Indian businessmen made, sought new, bold and highly 
remunerative avenues of investment in industries and thus over¬ 
came the lack of venture capital. Their own long standing ex¬ 
perience in running their own business houses made up for the 
lack of managerial exDerience and the import of foreign tech¬ 
nicians, mainly from Britain and Germany, filled the gap of 
technical skill. 
It will be seen that diverse reasons helped to bring 
about the evolution of the managing agency system. Though 
the British element was in the forefront, the Indian National 
Congress and the "Buy Indian11 movement which it sponsored, was 
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very helpful in the promotion of Indian owned and managed 
industries. Consequently, the British element could not but 
lessen in importance under this impact and it dwindled to a 
level in which one finds that in 1956-57 only 12 important 
British managing agency systems working in India. These 
agencies controlled 125 companies with a total paid up capital 
outlay of Rs. 258.4 million. The corresponding figures for 
Total Companies at work (exclusive of Insurance and Banking) 
was 23,642 having a total paid up capital of Rs. 9,239 million 
out of which 5,055 companies, having a total paid up capital 
of Rs. 4,654 million were under the control of the managing 
agents. 
Managing Agency: Theory and Practice 
A managing agency could be described as the 
institutional development of industrial organization 
where the promotion, finance and administration of 
a vast agglomoration of miscellaneous and unrelated 
enterprises are controlled by a single firm. The 
managing agency firm may take the organizational 
form of a partnership, a private or public limited 
company or could be an individual.-^ 
The Amending Act of 1936 defined the managing agency as 
a person, firm or company entitled to the management 
of the whole affairs of the company by virtue of an 
agreement with the company and under the control and 
direction of the directors except to the extent, if 
any, otherwise provided for in the agreement ana 
includes any person, firm or company, occupying such 
a position by whatever name called.0 
From the above definitions it can be seen that the 
chief function of the managing agents is the formation and 
operation of industrial and other enterprises. They would 
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involve three distinct operations: (1) Responsibilities con¬ 
nected with pioneering, promoting and launching of industrial 
enterprises; (2) Finding different avenues of financing these 
enterprises; and (3) Managing and running these concerns* 
As the promoters of the enterprise the managing agents 
are the trail blazers. The classic example of this has always 
been the promotion of India*s first Iron and Steel combine by 
the House of Tatas, The difficulties this managing agency had 
to face were enormous. The House of Tatas was the managing 
agency that was instrumental in locating the deposits of ore, 
in acquiring the concessions and in setting up the plant and 
machinery. It had the Herculean task in this process to set 
up the whole new township of "Jamshedpur"; since the village 
of Sakchi, originally considered as a suitable plant site 
was far too deep in the Bengal jungles. Host important was 
the question of finances. In accordance with customary pro¬ 
cedure the London money market was approached, however, it 
proved to be unresponsive. The burden therefore fell on the 
managing agents and they rose to this challenge. On the 
strength of the influence of the House, aided in no less 
manner by the fact that this was a purely Indian enterprise, 
the whole amount of 1,630,000 was raised in India—an 
astronomical sum for that country at the turn of the century. 
The work which the managing agents described >©s that 
of transforming an idea into a profit-yielding business. The 
importance of this promotional aspect of a managing agency 
is hard to minimize. For someone who is accustomed to the 
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specialized services of different agencies, it is understandably 
difficult to visualize a position where, till the establishment 
of the National Industrial Development Corporation in 1954 
(a government agency responsible for development and promotion 
of government backed and/or sponsored projects), there was no 
agency or business house responsible or capable of an exclusive 
handling of promotion of new enterprises. 
The figures in Table IV. 1 should be helpful in empha¬ 
sizing the role played by the managing agents in company pro¬ 
motion. It is evident from this table that as late as 1958/59 
the promotional activities of the managing agents are still 
prominent, forming as high as 52% of the total public company 
promotion. It should be borne in mind here that this number 
is one portion of the overall picture. The support given 
to other newly formed companies in an indirect manner is not 
accounted for. This is presumably because the managing agents 
or their friends either have adequate representation on the 
Board of Directors of the new company or are assured of a 
participation in the affairs of the new company by virtue of 
different relationship or connection. In the same manner, 
other groups that promote a particular concern and allow 
themselves to be classified as managing agents only after 
the concern has been registered and preliminaries have been 
completed are not taken into account. Nor has any mention 
been made about the expansion and/or diversificatory activities 
undertaken by the managing agents. If all these figures were 
taken into consideration, the participation of the managing 
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TABLE IV.1 
CONTRIBUTION OF MANAGING AGENTS TO SHARE CAPITAL 
OF NEW COMPANIES 
COMPANIES WITH 
YEAR 
1 
TOTAL COMPANIES MANAGING AGENTS 
? as % of Number 
2 
Paid Up 
Capital 
3 
Number 
4 
Paid Up ! 
Capital 
5 
1951.52 511 7021 62 1372 19.5 
1952.53 181 2077 26 441 21.2 
1953.54- 199 2275 25 324 14.2 
1954.55 219 17W8 23 1708 9.8 
1955.56 186 6789 10 530 7.8 
1956.57 82 4411 6 1452 32.9 
1957.58 64 5264 11 1100 20.9 
1958.59 58 5867 3 3050 52.0 
(The numbers relate to Public Companies only.) 
(Figures are in Rs. 00,000.) 
Source? National Council of Applied Economic 
Research, "Managing Agency System.” Asia Publishing House, 
New Delhi, 1959, Pp. 67-7?. 
71 
agents would loom much larger than the Table IV.1 indicates. 
Besides promoting new industries the managing and 
running the existing ones also forms an important activity- 
on part of the managing agents. In one sense it could be 
even more important part of their overall function since it 
is customary for managing agents to assume control of other 
companies. In this way McLeod & Company took over the agency 
of Alexandria Jute Mills Company Ltd. from Messrs. Begg Dunlop 
and Co.; Sri Krishna Investment Co. Ltd. of Clive Mills 
Company Limited from Bird and Co.; Kalyanji Mavji & Co. of 
Bengal Bhatdee Co. Ltd. from Andrew Yule and Company. 
According to Indian practices, the affairs of any 
public comuany are under the direct authority of the Board of 
Directors. With the managing agents in the picture, this 
format is retained while the actual power tends to shift 
into the hands of the managing agents. In case of companies 
where the managing agents hold a controlling or a substantial 
interest in the form of stocks the Board turns into a rubber 
stamp body nominated by and acceptable to the managing agents. 
How the managing agents come to acquire unlimited control of 
the management of the company is best illustrated from the 
following citations from two agreements. In 19^8 the Bird 
and Company concluded a managing agency agreement in Calcutta 
with Landsdown Jute Co. Ltd., whereby the managing agents were, 
subject to the control and direction of the Board of Directors, 
to manage the affairs of the company, except where 
such control and/or direction constitutes a 
derogation of the powers of the managing agents^ 
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to manage the affairs of the company under any conditions. 
The South India Agency Limited became the managing agents of 
Rodier Textile Mills Limited, operating 
under the control and direction of the Board of 
Directors except in the discharge of their duties 
and exercise of their powers.^ 
The list of duties and powers included almost every important 
field of management; the appointment and dismissal of person¬ 
nel, including the officers of the company; the power to 
negotiate, conclude and honor contracts of every type for and 
on behalf of the company; the power to make and receive pay¬ 
ments or enter into financial arrangements; the power to open 
and operate bank accounts, retain the monies of the company 
in their own name and to create charge on the company's assets. 
In many cases it was possible for the managing agents to be 
appointed the Purchasing Agents and/or the Sales Agents. 
Having under their control and direct authority so many diverse 
powers, it is no wonder that the managing agents became a 
prime mover in the corporate affairs. The managing agent is 
the key figure when one considers an agency that has such 
powers in many different concerns including such divers fields 
as iron and steel aircraft, locomotives, automobiles and truck 
manufacture, machinery and machine tools, textiles, chemicals, 
toiletries, radio and communications, banking, insurance, 
investment, hotels, scientific research and many others. In 
this single instance the tremendous influence of such firms 
will be apparent. 
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Managing Agents and Corporate Finances; 
However, It is the financial aspect of this system that 
is most important and relevant to the discussion here. There 
are different ways the managing agents can influence the finances 
of the company they manage. More often than not it is the 
managing agent that has promoted the company and therefore the 
preliminary expenses are paid by him. (These are invariably 
recovered from the company, but this recovery does not lessen 
in any way the importance or the value of this initial con¬ 
tribution, especially since this amount can at times form as 
high a percentage to the total paid up capital as 10#.) Once 
the company has been promoted, the contribution of the managing 
agents comes in the form of purchase of stock. The amount of 
this stock participation has shown considerable variation 
over the years and differs not only from one managing agent 
to another but also from one managed company to another, even 
if both are controlled by the same managing agent. Thus the 
evidence given before the Tariff Commission in 1932 indicates 
that the managing agents in Ahmedabad area held stacks varying 
from 60 to 85# of the total subscribed capital in the cotton 
textile mills managed by them. The managing agents of Basanti 
Mills held 80# of the stock, while four of the partners of 
the managing agency firm and their relatives together held 
25*000 shares out of a subscribed total of 51*980 shares. In 
19^5 the situation was similar—for example, the managing 
agents of Sri Digvijay Cement Company Limited, Messrs. Luxmi 
Agents, took uo 20# of the subscribed capital stock of the 
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company. Motwane Limited contributed 32$ of the subscribed 
capital stock of the Motwane Radio Manufacturing Company 
Limited and brought the company into being. A different type 
of contribution was effected by Amalgam Limited whereby 
together with their collaborators, they contributed the entire 
capital outlay of India Piston Private Limited; Amalgam hold¬ 
ing the majority interest. 
It should not be assumed that the holding of the 
managing agents is always that high. Figures in Table IV.2 
refer to the survey made of the more important managing 
agents in the Jute and Coal industry. It should be noticed 
here that the Andrew Yules, controlling fifteen coal com¬ 
panies, maintain a holding which ranges between 3? to 22$. 
At the same time they are able to restrict their holdings 
to a level as low as 7% in one of their Jute mills. It 
should be understood here that their contributory level is 
by no means rigid. It is quite likely that the managing 
agents may change their holding—by increasing or decreasing 
it. Thus in case of Standard Jute Company, the managing 
agents, Bird and Company, had no holding at all in 1951? 
bought 676 equity shares in 1954 and raised this number 
to 975 in 1955. The holding of Messrs. James Finlay & Co. 
shows an unusual degree of variation. This may be seen in 
the data in Table IV.3. One reason for this seemingly erratic 
fluctuation could be attributed to the financial well-being 
of the managed company. It is found that when the confidence 
of the investors or the rate of profits is low, the managing 
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TABLE IV.2 
SHARES HELD BY MANAGING AGENTS IN MANAGED 
COMPANIES 
Managing Agent Mills managed % of shareholding 
Andrew Yule & Co. 8 29,24,14,30,43,21 
26,7. 
Begg Dunlop & Co. 4 35,30,10,13 
23,16,13,15,17 
15,16 
Kettlewell Bullen 2 15,38 
Jardine & Skinner 4 ifi s13-"7 MacKinnon 2 
McLeod 4 
ttfr'72 Barry 2 
Managing Agent Collieries Managed % of shareholding 
Andrew Yule 15 43,30,31,27,25,22, 
55,26,46,38,22,34, 
40,30,51. 
Heilgers 7 44,31,68,57,44,25, 
28 
Martin & Co. 7 19,22,31,79,18,73, 
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37,47,34,24,36,42 Shaw Wallace 6 
Low & Co. 5 68,17,33,28,26 
McNeill & Co. 7 
j 
27,97,30,56,81, 
38,65. 
Adapted from: Raghbir Singh Bhatia, Role of Foreign 
Investment in Economic Development of India, Unpublished 
Thesis, Micro-^ilm obtained at the Library of Congress, 
Washington, D. C. 
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TABLE IV.3 
CHANGES IN SHAREHOLDING OF MANAGING AGENTS IN 
MANAGED COMPANIES 
YEAR 1918 1920.21 1922.23 1934 1935.36 1951 
Percent 
Holding 
78 66 91 0.002 63 38 
Source: S. K 
Press, Calcutta, 1958 
. Basu. Managing Agency System. World 
. Pp. 354-360. 
TABLE IVA 
VALUE OF SHARES HELD BY MANAGING AGENTS 
COMPANIES 
IN MANAGED 
Range of No. of 
subscribed Companies 
capital in each 
group 
00,000 
Total 
subscribed 
capital in 
each group 
00,000 
Value of 
shares 
held by 
Mng. Agts 
00,000 
% of total 
subscribed 
capital 
. held by MAs 
Up to 10 10 37.41 10.09 26.97 
10-20 12 185.71 45.27 24.38 
20-30 10 253-16 89.72 35.44 
30-50 lb 591.75 157.68 26.65 
50-80 7 466.72 133.98 28.71 
80-100 8 732.12 188.34 25.73 
Source: National Council of Applied Economic 
Research, Managing Agency System. Asia Publishing House, 
New Delhi, 1959, P. 69. 
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agents usually carry the burden of corporate finances them¬ 
selves* It is also found that in case of those companies 
that have a good profitability record or are considered 
successful and well supported by the investing public, the 
managing agents prefer to have low holdings. For example, 
the Andrew Yules have no holding at all in Belvedere Jute 
Mills, considered to be a sound and successful concern, while 
they held 22.2% of the equity stock in Port Engineering 
Company in 1957, as compared to a holding of 18.48# in 1951. 
In the analysis carried out in 1958, when 66 public 
limited companies in Bombay area were surveyed, the results 
show an overall holding of 20-25%. These figures, referred 
in Table IV.4, could be taken to represent a general picture. 
Two notes could be appended here. It is not always 
possible to ascertain the financial contribution of the 
managing agents with any certitude. The reason for this is 
that in India, the term "relatives, associates and friends” 
is flexible to an extent not found in any of the western 
countries. Thus, on the register of the company, maintained 
according to the requirement of the law by the company, one 
may find many shares standing in the name of one party. For 
example, a mill in Bombay, 2,863 Preferred shares out of a 
total of 4,000 stood in the name of a Maharaja. This con¬ 
tribution would not have been made at all had the managing 
agents not been the prime mover in the transaction. To what 
extent the managing agents have been influential in attract¬ 
ing such finances is impossible to determine. This difficulty 
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arises because of the personal factors, which are predominant 
in these instances, do not lend themselves to calculations in 
terms of dollars and cents. 
Then again, the practice of holding stock in the form 
of Bearer shares or "benami" (lit, "Nameless") as they are 
known in India, precludes a precise classification, even when 
they are known to have been held and contributed by the managing 
agents. 
Thus the actual contribution of the managing agents to 
the capital stock of the company would have to rank much higher 
than the figures cited so far have shown. 
Besides equity participation, the managing agents are 
known to have been influential in securing long term finances 
for their companies. This can take two forms. The company 
may either receive direct loans from the managing agents or 
the managing agents may attract Deposits from the Public for 
the company. 
One would get some idea of the extent to which the 
company may stand indebted to the managing agents from a 
reference made by Sir Leslie Hudson in his speech before the 
India Legislative Assembly— 
They (the managing agents) made unsecured advances to 
the extent of Rs. 2,800,000 and in addition to this took 
up nearly 95# of the Debenture issue the company had 
floated.^ 
This is by no means the customary percentage of the contri¬ 
bution made by the managing agents, but should nonetheless 
indicate the extreme to which the managing agents are prepared 
to go. A fair picture could be obtained from the three tables 
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presented together here, Tables IV.5, IV.6 and IV.7. Table 
IV.5 has the statewise distribution of the leading activities 
of the managing agents. It should be noticed that in case of 
comparatively highly developed state such as Bombay or West 
Bengal, the managing agents are responsible for only 12.58 and 
17.47#, respectively, of the total loans and advances received 
by their companies. This percentage shows a rise from 23.05# 
in Madras to 52.35# in Mysore to reach the high point of 
97.14# in Andhra. In case of the survey of 64 cotton textile 
mills in Bombay and 56 mills in Ahmedabad the amounts re¬ 
ceived from the managing agents, attain the level of 21# and 
24# respectively. In Table IV.7 a trend can be noticed: the 
smaller the company in size the higher is the share of the 
managing agents. In case of companies that have paid up 
capital between Rs. 0—1,000,000 and between Rs. 2 million 
to Rs. 3 million, the percentage of the direct loans from the 
managing agents amounts to almost 50#; while in case of firms 
having capital above Rs. 10 million, this contribution dwindles 
down to a meager 0.79#« 
Another way the managing agents influence financing 
directly is by attracting deposits from private parties, a 
feature that is peculiar only to India. Such a deposit is a 
fixed-time deposit, usually for a medium-long term, bearing 
a fixed rate of interest. This differs from the Debentures 
in one marked respect in that this is not a bond issue and 
as such is not offered on the market. The deposits however 
do create a charge on the assets of the company and rank first 
in case of liquidation and take precedence over other obliga¬ 
tions including institutional advances and loans. The essence 
TABLE IV.5 
LENDING ACTIVITIES OF THE MANAGING AGENTS 
bo 
STATE LOANS 
ADVANCED 
BY 
MANAGING 
AGENTS 
LOANS 
GUARAN¬ 
TEED BY 
MANAGING 
AGENTS 
LOANS 
FROM 
BANKS 
TOTAL 
LOANS 
AND 
ADVANCES 
2 & 3 
AS 
A % 
OF 
5 
Andhra 32 2 1 35 97.14 
Bombay 376 114 3404 3894 12.58 
Madras 61 107 561 729 23.05 
W. Bengal 96 20 548 664 17.47 
Mysore 36 53 81 170 52.35 
Delhi 3? 58 224 317 29.34 
Figures obtained from: 11 Figures delating to 1340 
Managing Agents managing 1720 Companies*1: Research & 
Statistics bivision. Company Law Administration, Government 
of India$ New Delhi, 1951-1952. 
TABLE IV.6 
FINANCES OF COMPANIES UNDER THE MANAGING AGENTS IN 
INDIA 
64 MILLS IN BOMBAY 56 MILLS IN AHMEDABAD 
AMOUNT % OF TOTAL AMOUNT % OF TO^At 
Amounts received from 
Managing Agents • • . 532 21 264 24 
From Banks. 226 9 42 4 
By Public Deposits. . . 237 11 426 39 
Share Capital. 1214 49 3*+0 32 
Debentures ••••••• 238 10 8 1 
Source* P. A. Wadia & K. T. Merchant, ”Our Economic 
Problem.” Vora & Co., 1957* Bombay. Pp. 625. 
TABLE IV.7 
LOANS TO MANAGED COMPANIES BY MANAGING AGENTS 
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Range No. of Deben- Total Guaran- Direct Other Total 
of Paid Cos in tures Bank teed by loans loans loans 
up Cap. each Loans MAs by MAs 
group 
0-10 77 / 5.oo 68.46 31.55 81.90 37.41 200.30 
10-20 25 73.63 58.60 25.6 7 11.50 - 199.18 
20-30 9 7.00 20.49 15.73 24.17 - 51.66 
30-50 lb 113.35 180.94 12.69 34.54 10.95 342.42 
50-70 8 80.73 427.69 18.00 78.09 7.65 594.16 
70-100 4 30.00 172.03 - 1.65 2.84 206.52 
100 up 6 20.00 138.85 138.73 0.79 677.24*1972.72 
♦World Bank loan to Indian Iron and Steel Company 
Limited, 92$ of total of other loans. 
Source: NCAER, "Managing Agency SystemAsia Pub¬ 
lishing House, New Delhi ,1959,'" Pp .77. 
TABLE IV.8 
LOANS GUARANTEED BY MANAGING AGENTS 
Large Total Guaranteed 2 as $ 
sized loans by MAs of 1 
Companies (i) (2) (3) 
Secured from Banks 38.40 27.20 70.8 
Unsecured from Banks 
Govt, and State Agen 
4.35 1.37 31.5 
Medium 
cies 30.69 2.51 8.2 
sized 
Companies 
Secured from Banks 
Unsecured from 
1493.90 777.70 52.1 
Banks 
Govt, and State 
255.10 72.4 
9 - 
28.4 
Agencies 186.00 82.6 bb.b 
Source: Ibid.. Pp. 73-7V. 
of these deposits is that they are solicited personally and 
privately either directly or through agents. There does not 
exist any organized agency for soliciting these. Its success 
with one company and failure with another is essentially con¬ 
nected with the managing agents of the particular firm. The 
system is more popular in Bombay and Ahmedabad, though 
practiced throughout in the country. One reason for their 
popularity is that 
people trusted their savings to men whom they knew 
and with whom they could deal without the formalities 
necessary in dealing with the Banks.^ 
Table IV.6 indicates that 11# of the total advances were 
composed of public deposits in Bombay, while the corresponding 
figure for Ahmedabad was 39#. 
The number of managing agents that manage only one 
company far outstrips the number of the managing agents that 
manage more than one, although it is the latter type that 
affords the example of the type described hereafter. It was 
discussed earlier how the managing agents control companies 
in more than one sphere of Industry. No two companies can 
either be expected to operate in similar ways, or have identical 
financial requirements. This gives the managing agents a chance 
to bolster the finances of one company by "Loans and Advances" 
from another company—both of these being under the same manage¬ 
ment. Advantage is taken of the sound positions of one company 
to help out the other company in difficulties. This can be 
done in two ways. The surplus funds of one may be transferred 
as a "Loan" to the needy company. The temporary or short term 
nature of such loans is illusory because an almost automatic 
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renewal of the loan for as long a period as necessary (the 
decision being that of the managing agents) turns this into 
a mode of long-term financing. The funds may also be raised 
on the credit worthiness of one company and advanced to another 
under the same management. For example, in Bombay, the Swan 
Mills had received as a loan the sum of Rs. 550,000 from 
Finlay Mills, as did the Gold Mohur Mills a sum of Rs. 300,000t 
all the three mills being under the management of the same 
agency. In Calcutta, 50,000 shares of the Megna Mills Company 
Limited, out of a total of 61208 subscribed shares, were taken 
up by the India Jute Company Limited. In addition, India 
Jute advanced an unusually high sum of Rs. 6,552,000 to Megna 
Mills; Needless to say both these firms were managed by the 
same agency. From this type of inter-firm financing not even 
the most reputed Agency Houses are immune. The Swadeshi Mills 
and the Ahmedabad Advance Mills took up Rs. 6,000,000 worth 
of debentures out of a total of Rs. ten million floated by the 
Tata Mills: All three managed by the foremost agency house in 
India—the House of Tatas. 
As has been emphasized in discussing the policies of 
Banks with reference to industrial financing, Equity participa¬ 
tion is in disfavor. However, Table IV.8 indicates that their 
loans and advances form a heavy proportion. The point of 
importance here is that all these loans, whether secured or 
unsecured, have been guaranteed by the managing agents. This 
would mean that if the managing agents had not been prepared 
to guarantee or stand surety to these loans, and if these 
guarantees had not been acceptable to the banks a source of 
finance amounting to 70.8$ and 31•5$ in case of large size 
companies and 52.1$ and 28.4$ in case of medium sized companies 
would have been unavailable. When taken into consideration 
that these loans form the working capital employed by the 
companies, the important role played by the managing agents 
can perhaps be better understood. It is interesting to note 
that unsecured loans form as high a percentage as 31*5$ and 
28.4$ of the contributions. These loans are obtained without 
any collateral. The banks are prepared to advance these sums 
on the guarantee that the managing agents themselves would be 
responsible for honoring the commitments involved in such a 
transaction. This personal guarantee is the most important 
factor in influencing the decision of the bank in favor of 
the company. 
The conditions imposed by the banks on their lending 
policies stem directly from the two aspects of the managing 
agency system. Firstly, it is the managing agents that are 
in control of the day to day management of the company and 
are therefore in a better position to know how the company 
fares. Secondly, the resources at their command justify 
the confidence the banks have in these managing agents. If 
to these two the incalculable facotrs of prestige and in¬ 
fluence are added, then it should not be difficult to under¬ 
stand why the managing agents play such a crucial role in 
Indian corporate financing. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE ORGANIZED CAPITAL MARKET 
Four aspects of the organized capital market are taken 
for consideration here* How they have come to develop 
and how they have similarity to similar western insti¬ 
tutions is discussed. 
Their organization in the Indian context is discussed. 
How, in spite of the organizational progress, the 
original philosophy has remained unshaken and how these 
modern methods and institutions are used by different 
groups to retain and possibly enlarge their grasp over 
the financial matters is presented. 
The factual data presented leads to the conclusion 
structurally the Indian capital market has progressed 
very well. However, the peculiar methods of operation 
maintain the traditional philosophy and make it 
impossible to have any progress there. Family and 
group are as influential as they were earlier. 
/ 
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The term Organized Capital Market comprises those 
agencies whose primary business is the channeling of the 
•fe 
country*s financial resources, private as well as corporate, 
to profitable investment. For the purpose of discussion 
here, four sections of the Organized Market are considered. 
These are the Insurance companies, the Investment Trusts, 
the Underwriters and the New Issue Market and the Stock 
Exchange. In India all these institutions are in existence 
and in operation. Yet where corporate investment is con¬ 
cerned, there are no scientific, modern principles governing 
it. What govern the actual practice are factors like the 
family oriented, group minded philosophy. 
The Insurance Companies} 
The origins of the insurance business in India go 
back as far as 1818 when the Oriental Life Insurance Company 
was organized in Calcutta. The development of the insurance 
business continued sporadically until the turn of the century. 
The Swadeshi (Nationalistic) movement lent an impetus to the 
insurance business. More and more companies were organized 
and business increased to great proportions. It was felt that 
this growing sector should be organized and regulated under a 
separate act. Also there was the demand that some kind of 
protection be afforded to the policy holder. All these factors 
necessitated the passing of the first Indian Insurance Act in 
1912. The first World War also increased the total business 
of the companies. The lure of profitable and expanding busi¬ 
ness brought in its wake many discrepancies and abuses. In 
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the scramble for business the expense ratio mounted. The 
system of giving rebates on commissions, already exorbitantly 
high, forced many companies to work on very low margins and led 
many into speculative activities and dangerous ventures. The 
Depression wiped out the weak companies and forced others that 
did not have sufficient financial resources to close up. 
Speculative and unwise investments brought a speedy end to 
the activities of many other companies. These reasons have 
been a contributory factor in the formation of an informal 
convention among the insurance companies to seek non-specula- 
tive securities for their investment. The data in Table V.l 
p^fl^cts this attitude. At the end of the second World War, 
the non-corporate investment ranks as high as 84.9$, out of 
which 68.% is accounted for by the Government securities. 
However, the excess in profits and the new business generated 
by war conditions sought new outlets where higher returns 
seemed probable. This is reflected in the increase in invest¬ 
ment in corporate issues from 6.3# in 1939 to 9.4# in 1944 
to reach 12.2# in 1948. A further spurt was received in the 
Korean war boom and the ratio stood in 1954 at 16.3#—an all- 
time high for the insurance companies. The variation then 
over the 17-year period stands at 9.0. As Table V.2 indicates 
this is entirely at the expense of the Government and semi- 
Government securities. 
The year 1956 is of importance for the Indian Life 
Insurance business. The business was nationalized that year 
and the assets transferred to the newly-created Life Insurance 
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TABLE V.l 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL ASSETS OF 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 
1939 - 1958 
TYPE OF INVESTMENT 1939 1944 194-8 1950 1955 1956 1958 
GOVERNMENTS: 
1. Central & State 
Government se- 
curities • • • 59.5 62.3 55.4 51.6 45.3 49.4 50.7 
2. Government ap- 
proved security 8.1 5.5 5.2 4.8 5.7 7.3 7.3 
3. Foreign Govt, 
securities • • 1.1 0.7 1.5 1.7 2.0 3-2 1.? 
LAND & HOUSE PROPERTY 6.8 4.6 3.4 4,2 4.7 4.7 4.4 
MORTGAGES ON PROPERTY 2.9 l.l 2.3 2.4 4.1 3.6 2.5 
LOANS ON POLICIES 9.1 5.9 5.3 6.1 8.2 8.9 7.9 
MISCELLANEOUS .... 6.7 5.7 15.9 14.0 2.5 9.6 19.5 
TOTAL NON CORPORATE 
INVESTMENT. . . 93.2 90.6 87.8 85.4 83.9 86.1 84.9 
CORPORATE INVESTMENT 6.8 9.4 12.2 14.6 16.1 13.9 15.1 
Source: S.R.K. Rao, "The Indian Honey Market” 
Chaitanya Publishing House, Allahabad, 1959* P. 21. 
TABLE V.2 
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VARIATION IK INVESTMENT OF INSURANCE COMPANIES AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ASSETS 
INVESTMENT CATEGORY 1938 19 55* VARIATION 
GOVERNMENT SECURITIES 62.6 53.0 - 9.6 
LOANS 9.2 8.2 - 1.0 
LAND AND BUILDINGS 6.3 4.7 - 1.6 
SHARES AND DEBENTURES 7.1 16.1 ♦ 9.0 
MORTGAGES 3.2 ^.1 ♦ 0.9 
Source: A, N, . Agarwala, M Insurance in India". 
Allahabad Lav Journal Press, Allahabad, I960. 
TABLE V.3 
POLICIES OUTSTANDING AND INVESTMENTS OF L.I .C. 
195? 1956 1957 1958 I960 1961 
New policies issued 240.5 187.7 277.7 339.1 498.0 609.0 
Policies Outstanding 1128.0 N.A. 137“+.0 1584.0 2285.0 2737.0 
Premium Income 58.3 37.6 88.1 73.1 97.0 112.3 
Corporate Investment 16.1 13.9 14.9 15.1 21.3 22.1 
Sourcet Indian Insurance Yearbooks, Bombay, L I C 
Annual Reports, Bombay, 
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Corporation of India (LIC). Inasmuch as the LIC was created 
to do away with malpractices, it was expected that the atten¬ 
tion of the officers of the Corporation would now be focused 
on internal structure, expansion of business and the liquida¬ 
tion of investments that became undesirable burdens. This is 
reflected in Table V.3. While the figures for the Hew Policies 
Issued show a continuous rise after the dip in 1956 (attrib¬ 
utable perhaps to the initial adjustment difficulties of the 
newly-created Corporation) the investment in corporate 
securities shows a lover ratio at 13.9# and 14.9#. 3y the year 
1961 the LIC had more than doubled Its total Policies Out¬ 
standing and appropriately enough its advances to the Private 
3ector, including Banking, Trade and Commerce rose to 22.1#. 
A comparative study of the Life Insurance invest¬ 
ments in industry Is seen in Table V.4. The change in in¬ 
vestments in different sectors over the fifteen years in four 
countries is seen. In the TJ.S., the industries almost doubled 
their share from 24.7# to 43.7#. In the U.K., the industries 
show a similar rise from 27.0# to 40.0#. In a sharp contrast 
to this the share of Indian industries has increased from 9.4# 
to 14.8# only. Viewed against the background of a capital 
market that does net feature debentures as prominently as in 
the U.S., the percentage reveals its inadequacy. 
Disappointing as these figures are, it has to be 
understood that the policy of investment is governed by law 
and rules. Thus the LIC cannot invest in Government and Semi- 
Government securities less than 50# of its available funds and 
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TABLE V.4 
DISTRIBUTION OF LIFE INSURANCE INVESTMENTS AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ASSETS 
Country Govern¬ 
ment & 
semi- 
Govern- 
ment 
Indus¬ 
try 
Mort¬ 
gages 
Loans 
on 
pol¬ 
icies 
Govern-\ 
ment & 
semi- 
Govern- 
ment 
Indus- Mort- 
try gages 
\ Loans 
on 
pol¬ 
icies 
India 69.7 9.4 1.0 4.8 60.7 14.8 1.5 7.0 
TJ.S.A. 50.3 24.7 14.8 4.4 9.6 43.7 34.9 4.4 
U.K. 50.1 27.0 6.6 1.2 26.7 4o.O 14.9 1.3 
Japan 40.2 16.5 - 2.1 21.7 - 49.6 
Source: Journal "Commerce*" Bombay. Issue of 
January 27, 1962. 
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in non-corporate investments not less than 15$, leaving only 
35$ of the total investment available for corporate invest¬ 
ment. This 35$ has to be invested in the ordinary stock of 
only those companies that have paid dividends of not less 
than b% on the face value for seven out of nine preceding 
years. It could be invested in preference shares of com¬ 
panies or debentures of only such companies that have paid 
dividends on their ordinary shares for five out of seven 
preceding years. Even this investment cannot exceed 2i$ 
of the total or 10$ of the share and debenture liability 
of these companies. With all these restrictions, the profit¬ 
ability of such an investment from the point of view of 
dividend payments is not satisfactory. As is seen in Table 
A.l in Armendix 1, Indian companies do not pay very regular¬ 
ly any dividends. This would go a long way in discouraging 
any thoughts of substantial investment. With these great 
odds in mind it should not be difficult to see how or why 
the insurance participation in financing industries is so 
low. 
Investment Trusts; 
The idea of an investment trust which has for its 
purpose diversified investment in different industrial 
securities while drawing its support from different sources, 
is almost non-existent. The reasons for this underdevelop¬ 
ment are not difficult to understand. The idea itself has not 
been understood very widely and as such the individual investor 
prefers to hold the securities himself rather than entrust his 
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savings to a company which might make unwise decisions and 
end up with unsound investments. Also the preference of the 
individual investor in India is for such securities which will 
get him a rapid capital appreciation, rather than a steady 
dividend return—a principle upon which a prudent investment 
trust would not lean very heavily. 
This does not mean, however, that there are no invest¬ 
ment trusts in India. In 1957* 619 investment trust companies 
reported operating on a paid up capital of Hs. 370 million. 
However, only nine companies had a capital outlay exceeding 
Hs. 5 million each. Fifty percent of the remaining 610 were 
operating on a capital outlay of less than Hs. 100,000.00. 
The reason for this unusually high number of operating 
investment trusts may be found in the following two quota¬ 
tions: 
There is at present a fairly large number of companies 
which are registered as investment and trust companies 
(separate data for Investment trusts only not being 
available) but the vast majority of them do not perform 
the functions of a true investment trust. Most of them 
are connected with the management of funds of a few rich 
individuals and families or of managing agents for 
investment In companies controlled by them, and are in 
the nature of holding companies rather than public 
trusts. 
. let it be noted however, that the majority 
of investment trust companies operating in this country 
are of a closed end type and are primarily engaged 
either in administering the funds of wealthy interests 
or are connected with managing agency houses. These 
managing agency houses have formed these investment 
companies with the avowed object of keeping control 
over the companies under their management. This process 
has permitted them considerable in-corporate investment 
under the administration of one single agent.^ 
Table V.5 lists the important investment trusts showing the 
extent of their investments, with their group affiliations in 
TABLE V.5 
INVESTMENT TRTJSTS IN INDIA 
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NAME PAID UP 
CAPITAL 
INVESTMENTS GROUP 
AFFILIATION 
Birds Investments Ltd. 4,400,000 6,517,559 Bird 
General Investment & 
Trust Co. Ltd. 425,000 547,401 M 
Eastern Investments Ltd i. 7,626,000 16,231,176 Lord Cable 
Industrial Investment 
Trust Limited 9,999,250 12,685,964 Premchand 
Investment and Finance 
Company Limited 900,000 1,526,970 Bird 
J. K. Investment Trust Ltd.7,257,700 2,650,093 Singhania 
New India Investment 
Corporation Ltd. 2,332,100 3,629,480 Birla 
Calcutta Investment Ltd i. 5,500,000 5,280,053 Goenka 
Clive Row Investment 
Holding Co. Ltd. 13,880,000 20,594,990 Andrew Yule 
Investment Corporation 
of India N.K. 35,200,000 Tata 
Source: S. K. Sur: Stock Exchange and New Issue Market 
Indian Institute of Social Studies, Calcutta, 1961. pp. w. 
TABLE V.6 
RESERVES OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS 
NAME PAID UP 
CAPITAL 
RESERVES 
Bird*s Investment Ltd. 4,400,000 779,721 
Eastern Investments Ltd. 7,626,000 5,717,047 
Industrial Investment 
Trust Ltd. 9,999,250 2,021,794 
New India Investment 
Corporation Ltd. 2,332,100 777,391 
Source: Ibid., Pp. 50. 
parentheses. 
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The investment trusts as seen in Table V.? in all 
except two cases, have investments exceeding their paid up 
capital. The additional resources came from the undistributed 
profits which have been accumulating and have been reinvested 
over many years. The profits thus earned are transferred to 
reserves, which accumulate in time to form a sizable bloc, 
as can be seen in Table V.6. The advantage of share value 
appreciation are also not distributed, nor are the special 
reserves arising out of premiums charged at the issue of 
shares. Their investments range over a wide area. However, 
the fact that most of these have group affiliations, makes 
the distribution of any profits and/or bonus reserves almost 
a family affair. This could be considered the reason the 
investment trusts have not been able to popularize themselves. 
The Underwriters: 
The underwriting operations in IncUa are of interest, 
if only because of their elusive nature. Beneficial by nature 
in all respects, the first attempt at underwriting is recorded 
in 1912, when the Stock Broker*s firm of Messrs. Batlivala and 
Karani underwrote the shares of the Central India Spinning and 
Weaving Company Limited. In 1913 Mr. Chunilal Saraiya under¬ 
wrote the entire Preference share issue of Messrs. Tata Mills 
Limited. The underwriting activity lagged during the Twenties, 
however, in the late thirties a total of nine issues was under¬ 
written. 
Prominent among these were: Hindustan Bicycle Mfg. Co. 
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Ltd, and Industrial Corporation Limited by their managing agents 
Industrial Syndicate; Steel Corporation of Bengal by the Indian 
Iron and Steel Company Limited and Burn & Company; Raza Textiles 
Limited by the Investment Corporation of India Limited; Western 
India Match Company Limited by the Investment Corporation Ltd, 
and the Central Bank of India; Textile Machinery Corporation 
Ltd, by Hindustan Investments Limited; Devkaran Nanjee Invest¬ 
ment Corporation Ltd, by Devkaran Nanjee Banking Corporation 
Ltd, Among these the Hindustan Bicycles, Industrial Corpora¬ 
tion and Textile Machinery Corporation underwritings could be 
attributed to the House of Birlas, Those of Raza Textiles and 
Western India could be attributed to the House of Tatas. The 
Steel Corporation of Bengal was later merged into one of its 
underwriters and the managing agency of the resulting giant 
firm was taken over by Martin Burn, Limited, a firm into which 
the other underwriter of Steel Corporation of Bengal, the 
Burn & Company was merged. 
In 1946 underwriting activity was again on the upgrade 
with 30 issues totaling Rs, 165 million underwritten. This 
formed just over 41,9# of the total issue on the market, leaving 
about 58.1# of the total issue to be floated without any under¬ 
writing assistance. The important feature of the 1946 under¬ 
writing activity was the participation by the stock broking 
firms on a large scale and the underwriting assistance given 
by firms engaged in manufacturing or trading activity. Thus 
the Dalmia Cement and Paper Marketing Company Limited under¬ 
wrote the issue of Dalmia Jain Airways Limited. Both, in¬ 
cidentally, belong to House of Dalmia-Jain. Investment Trusts 
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were active too. Investment Corporation of India Ltd, under¬ 
wrote the issue of the National Rayon Corporation Ltd.; both 
belonging to the House of Tatas. 
Underwriting was resorted to on a large scale in the 
second half of the fifties. From the total issue of Rs. 40 
million in 1956, this amount increased to Hs. 233 million in 
I960. Out of this total amount, issues worth Rs. 21.1 million 
were underwritten as compared to 142.3 million in i960. 
Participation by the banks and stock broking firms in this 
was of significant importance. More important was the bold 
leadership given by the agencies of Government of India: 
The Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), the Industrial 
Finance Corporation (IFC), the State Bank of India (SBI), and, 
most Important of all, the Industrial Credit and Investment 
Corporation of India (ICICI). Over the period of five years, 
1956 to I960 stockbrokers underwrote 25$ of the total amount 
underwritten, banks underwrote 25% and the ICICI and LIC to¬ 
gether underwrote about 29$• The lead taken by these two 
agencies can be appreciated more when it is kept in mind that 
ICICI and LIC came into existence in 1955 and 1956. 
Many reasons could be advanced for the reluctant support 
industry has received in underwriting. In the first place the 
underwriter by the terms of his contract is obliged to take up 
those shares that are not subscribed by the public. The ex¬ 
perience of the "boom” years between 1955-60 has been that on 
an average lb% of the underwritten issue had to be taken up by 
the Underwriters and had to be covered by the guarantee, this 
percentage reaching its peak at 34g in 1956. Secondly, the 
underwriting in the non-government sector was never undertaken 
and implemented on any scientific well-tested principle. There 
was no attempt at a proper study of the market behavior. No 
survey is taken of investment climate. There is no systematic 
study of market operation and technique of issue placement. 
Underwriting has been undertaken by more than one 
individual underwriters, like Mr. Saraiya 
There are the stock brokers* firms, the banks, the insurance 
companies, the investment trusts, manufacturing firms and 
trading firms. All are engaged in the underwriting activity. 
However, none of these agencies are equipped, experienced 
or for that matter interested in underwriting operations that 
will rival the effort, study and experience that backs up a 
similar U.S. firm. The firms that did participate in these 
activities looked upon it as a type of a secondary or by-way 
operation and tried to be as selective as possible. This 
resulted in their choice of only such issues that did not 
actually need any underwriting. The Herd-instincts of the 
underwriters and the ever-repeating inbreeding that occurs 
were also the factors influencing the choice of particular 
issue for underwriting. It is difficult to justify the under¬ 
writing activity undertaken by a company that is primarily 
engaged in manufacturing activity because of group-oriented 
attitudes. Underwriting has always had periodic surges of 
activity. 
The lack of continuity in this respect is mainly 
due to the non-existence of issuing houses, investment 
banks and underwriting firms in this country. 
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Thus the underwriting took place only when any intra-group 
issues were floated or when the market conditions foretold 
a boom period. The underwriting of the Devkaran Nanjee Invest¬ 
ment Corporation Limited by the Devkaran Nanjee Banking Cor¬ 
poration Limited would be an example of intra-group under¬ 
writing. (A comparable situation would arise in the U.S. 
if the Christiana Corporation were to underwrite the issue 
of E. I. duPont.) The insistence of underwriters to expand 
their activities in the boom periods led an analyst to remark: 
.... it may be suspected that part of the 
underwriting has come from those who were influenced 
wholly by the fact that the issues they had under¬ 
written would have a 100$ chance of success. These 
underwriters inay be called fair weather friends. 
It may, therefore, be posed whether the present 
activity of the underwriters would continue if the 
capital market takes an unfavourable turn.. 
The Stock Exchanges and the New Issue Market: 
The development of stock exchanges in India has been 
the result of purely private endeavor. The foremost Stock 
Exchange began in Bombay as a private association of neople 
interested in dealing in stocks and bonds. Indeed, even to 
this day, it has retained its name as the Native and Stock 
Brokers Association. It is not registered as a corporate 
body, but has a recognition from the Government of India. 
> 
The Companies Act of 1913 permitted organization of Stock 
Exchanges on a corporate basis and advantage of this was 
taken to open Stock Exchanges in different places like 
Calcutta, Madras and Delhi. Until the enactment of the 
Securities Contract (Regulation) Act of 19?6, the control of 
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all the activities was in the hands of the Stock Exchange 
authorities themselves. This was reflected for example, in 
the provisions governing the memberships and new applications. 
In Bombay the membership is open only to the natives of India 
or the British subjects who have resided in the State of Bombay 
for at least five years prior to the application. In Calcutta 
a candidate has to pay an entrance fee of Rs. 5000.00; but if 
he is applying for the membership of a deceased member of his 
joint Hindu family, this fee is reduced to Rs. 500.00. In 
Madras, a nomination can be made by an existing member only 
in favor of the son, godson, nephew or brother of the retiring 
member. If a member dies without a nomination the legal heir 
can make a nomination. 
A member of a stock exchange in India acts in a dual 
capacity of a jobber and broker. No distinction is observed 
between the two as is observed in the London Stock Exchange. 
The members can employ remisiers or sub-brokers, who act as 
touts in securing business. 
The frequency of buying and selling transactions on 
a stock exchange determine the marketability of a share. In 
India the system is geared to the maximum flow of securities 
from one party to another. Such transactions as are carried 
out on behalf of genuine buyers interested in Investment for 
income rather than capital gains, are carefully distinguished 
from the speculative activities. The rules regulating these 
transactions are not very different from those found on the 
London or New York Exchanges. Thus the Securities Contract 
(Regulation) Act made it mandatory for every Stock Exchange 
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to obtain a certificate of registration from the Government 
of India, Like the SEC in the U.S., the Government of India 
has secured powers to supervise the activities of various stock 
exchanges as well as the individual brokers and, circumstances 
demanding, can require the erring Stock Exchange or the Ex¬ 
change member to refrain from any activity. In the same 
way, the Government of India can have the trading margin 
lowered or increased, in case of highly sensitive or highly 
speculative stocks, as the circumstances demand. 
Two types of transactions are peculiar to Indian stock 
exchange. These are the system of Badla and of Blank Transfer. 
there are facilities for carrying over a tran¬ 
saction from one settlement to another settlement; this, 
in the Indian market parlance, is known as a budla 
transaction. It is essential to note that carry-over 
is not compulsory; in fact that would be a wager con¬ 
tract and Invalid. The carry-over is effected by 
squaring up the transaction for the current settle¬ 
ment and simultaneously entering into a new tran¬ 
saction for the next settlement. Thus, a person 
who has bought 10 shares of Tata Steel, which is 
a 'forward1 scrip, has three choices before him. 
He may take delivery for the current settlement or 
sell them before settlement and thus square up his 
position or carry-over the purchase to the next 
settlement. The carry-over is done through sep¬ 
arate but simultaneous transactions, namely, sale 
for the current settlement and purchase for the 
next settlement. The operator has to pay a price for 
the facility of carrying over the transaction, which 
in effect amounts to borrowing money. The carry-over 
charge or the budla rate is normally determined by 
the prevailing short-term rate of interest, besides 
including a small insurance premium. Thus, if the 
price of the share is Rs. 150, the interest rate 6 
per cent and the period of the next settlement 15 
days, the budla, on the basis of pure interest, is 
38 nP. If the carry-over is large, the budla could 
even be at 50 nP. This means that if the share is 
sold for the current account for Rs. 150, it is 
simultaneously bought back for the next settlement 
at Rs. 150.50. 
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The person who is carrying over a sale transaction 
is in effect loaning money and so he receives a 
payment, that is, the difference between the purchase 
and sale price (i.e. the JO nP. in the above example). 
Also, the budla transaction is in effect advancing 
money without margin; partly for this reason the return 
on a budla transaction is slightly higher than the 
usual short-term rate of interest, i.e. it includes 
a risk premium,^ 
Blank Transfers 
imply shares registered in the name of parties 
unknown to the holder and transfer deeds signed by 
those parties as sellers, but are blank as regards 
the buyers name.,- 
The advantage here is that 
a possible squeeze in any scrip is prevented, as 
some shares continue to circulate in this blank form 
and serve as stock in trade. This practice is 
prevalent because it allows an easy Budla or a 
carry over. Another advantage is that through such 
a transfer the high burden of Government Stamp duty 
(varying from 0.75 to 1.5$) and transfer charges 
levied by the companies are avoided.^ 
The function of evaluation of securities through 
which the Stock Exchange eerves, directs the flow of 
the community's savings into the most productive 
forms of enterprise. Secondly the stock exchange 
ensures the liquidity of capital. By liquidity it 
is meant here the speed with which a capital asset 
is converted into a cash asset.^ 
But from the point of view of a businessman, the Stock Ex¬ 
change is not a source of constant financing. A change in 
the price of his share, high or low, neither soothes nor 
deepens his need. His interest in the stock market is rather 
latent. It is aroused at the time of issue of securities 
he is interested in floating, be they bonds, preference 
shares or ordinary, be it a new l^sue or a rights offer. 
How the Stock Market reacts, with what ease the investors 
accept his offer, influences his financial decision. The 
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new issue market would thus emerge as more important and in¬ 
fluential than the regular stock exchange. 
Indian stock exchanges have one additional advantage 
from the point of view of industries. Indian stock exchanges 
function as primary markets of issues. An individual firm 
can have two types of transactions in this respect. If the 
company is already listed on the stock exchange, that is to 
say, if the new issue is a lights issue or a Further issue, 
this issue can be directly placed on the market for sub¬ 
scription. If the company has not had any listings before 
then there are certain regulations which the issuing company 
has to follow. These regulations are designed to protect 
the investor. The issuing company has to furnish with regard 
to its various transactions, the reasons for making this 
issue, its record of profit distribution etc. It also has 
to oledge a certain portion exclusively for the stock ex¬ 
change. This way the stock exchange can function as a 
primary issue market. 
0 
In the Indian Capital Market, there are essentially 
four methods of raising capitals the Prospectus method, the 
Offer for Sale method, the 3tock Exchange Placement method 
and the Rights Issue method. 
(a) Prospectus is a document 
which discloses under legal penalty some specific 
information for the protection of investors.g 
A prospectus has to be filed with the Registrar of Companies 
and advertised In major newspapers. When these formalities 
have been completed the company may approach the public for 
subscription. Those companies that are not interested in offer¬ 
ing the issue to the general public, but wish to place the 
issue with private parties and interests, must also file a 
Statement in lieu of Prospectus with the Registrar. 
(b) Under the Offer for Sale method a private party 
or a consortium of private parties acquires a bloc of the 
issue and later offers it to the public at a fixed price. 
This method is perhaps more beneficial to the company, for 
it frees the company from the market fluctuations at any time. 
(c) According to the Stock Exchange Placement method, 
a company would place the share issue privately with the 
brokers and then on the strength of this placement secure 
a listing on the Exchange. The chief disadvantage of this 
method is that the brokers are in a position to create an 
artificial scarcity in that particular share and play the 
market to their own advantage. Though prevalent in the London 
Issue market, this method is being progressively discontinued 
in the Indian markets. 
(d) Offer to Shareholders is made when an existing 
company wishes to issue further capital. Indeed under Section 
81 of the Indian Companies Act, this is compulsory unless the 
Shareholders have waived their rights in a General Meeting. 
Whichever be the method employed, a consent of the 
Government of India has to be obtained for any issue. Em¬ 
powered under the Capital Issues (Control) Act, the Govern¬ 
ment of India can refuse any company a permit to issue and 
offer any security. The term security has been defined to 
mean (1) shares, stocks and bonds; (2) debentures; (3) mortgage 
10? 
deeds, instruments of pawn, pledge or hypothecation and any 
other instruments creating a charge or lien on the assets of 
the company; (4) instruments acknowledging indebtedness of the 
company. The Government can refuse permission for an issue 
on various grounds, such as the capital issue not being neces¬ 
sary for the immediate future; because the company has enough 
capital but has locked it up in undesirable investments; be¬ 
cause the proposed issue may cause an imbalance in the 
capital structure of the company (as between Equity and 
fixed interest bearing capital); because .the financial position 
of the company is unsatisfactory; or because the enterprise 
is speculative. 
In this fashion the Government of India has tried to 
* 
control the issue market in the country and protect the 
unwary investor from being caught in some unsound investment. 
f 
Kowever beneficial these provisions may sound from the point 
of view of the individual investor, these present a con¬ 
tinuous hazard for the Issuer of any new securities. As can 
be seen from the different provisions, any bid for new 
securities may be barred on grounds which would not come 
under the jurisdiction of the Government. All the decisions 
involved in such a decision would be considered in western 
countries, especially the U.S., as purely executive decisions. 
Yet in India this freedom is not given to the corporations. 
This has the effect of curbing any free floatations and 
indirectly affect the investing atmosphere in the country. 
Except for such precautionary provisions, the New 
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Issue Market and the Stock Exchanges could be considered well 
organized and would stand comparison with those abroad. Actual 
performance, however, has shown this situation to be sharply 
different. 
Table V.7 lists the issue financed over the five year 
period. Two findings require attention. The figures for total 
issue do not show any gradual progression. Rather, periodic 
bursts of a sort are noticed. Secondly, the figures for 
Further issue exceed beyond normalcy the Initial issues, in 
the early years and one may say that on the whole seem to 
hold their own well. Initial issues are made by the new 
companies and the Further issues are the bids for additional 
finances made by existing firms. The interpreted figures 
would mean therefore that the existing companies are in a 
position to cash in on their past performance and stand a 
better chance of getting issues through without apparent 
difficulty. This is attested by the fact that Further issues 
exceed the Initial issues 2:1 even in the later years. This 
means that the existing companies are placing more issues 
than the new companies. This the existing companies would 
not do unless they have an advantage over the Initial issues. 
However, not all the issues are brought to the Stock 
Exchange. Table V.7 indicates that a high percentage of issues 
is never offered to the public. Furthermore, the figures 
cited in Columns 1 to 4 refer only to issues floated by the 
Public Limited companies. The issues of the private limited 
companies are by law not put- on the market and are essentially 
taken up through private placements. Column 5 in Table V.7 
TABLE V.7 
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CAPITAL ISSUE BROUGHT TO THE MARKET AS COMPARED TO CAPITAL 
ISSUE FLOATED PRIVATELY 
TOTAL ISSUES FOR PUBLIC LTD. 
FIRMS. 
Initial Issues ...... 
Further Issues  
ISSUES BROUGHT TO MARKET . . 
3 as a % of 1 . 
TOTAL ISSUES FLOATED BY 
PRIVATE LTD. FIRMS . . . . 
1957 1958 1959 I960 (June) 
68.05 55.21 70.05 47.35 
12.05 14.95 26.50 15.58 
56.00 40.26 43.55 31.77 
43.15 29.31 26.85 15.25 
63 53 38 32 
13.73 16.43 26.60 16.26 
Sources Ibid.. Pp. 103-104. 
TABLE V.8 
SHARES OBTAINED BY DIRECTORS UNDER OFFER FOR SALE 
COMPANY TOTAL NO. 
OF SHARES 
OBTAINED 
BY DIREC¬ 
TORS AT 
PAR 
OFFERED 
TO PUBLIC 
AT A 
LATER DATE 
PREMIUM 
CHARGED 
AS A % 
Martin Burn 1,300,000 1,299,993 500,000 75.0 
Jardine 
Hendersons 200,000 199,993 98,000 120.0 
Shaw Wallace 650,000 650,000 300,000 80.0 
Gillanders 
Arbuthnot 64,900 64,900 22,543 87.5 
Rallis India 225,000 225,000 115,000 15.0 
Sources Ibid.. Pp. 64. 
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indicates that the percentage of issues not subscribed by- 
public at large is very high. 
The resultant inference here would then be that 
though the Stock Exchange has been fairly well developed, the 
majority of issues floated do not avail, themselves of the 
facilities. A similar difference between principle and prac¬ 
tice can also be seen in the Offer for Sale method of issue. 
It has already been explained that under such a method a bloc 
of shares is offered to a group of private interests, 
usually the Directors or the managing agents of the company. 
The extent of the influence which such interests have over 
such stock placings can be seen in the Table V.8. It can 
be seen that the overwhelming majority of shares has been 
taken up by the directors. Out of the shares taken up by 
them, an insignificant amount is offered to the public. 
The public, however, is never invited to contribute to the 
major portion. 
It could be said in conclusion that India at present 
possesses an excellent organized medium for the working of a 
capital market. The underwriting facilities available in the 
country should lead to more and more reliance on it by the 
business community. Yet in practice, it is the Government 
section through the ICICI and the LIC, that affords the dis¬ 
satisfied entrepreneur, not connected with any group or with¬ 
out any fraternal affiliations, an opportunity to avail 
himself of the underwriting facilities. The same is true 
of the Investment trusts. It may be asked whether these 
trusts are not able to broaden their base and develop on 
1C9 
the lines evident in other countries. Indeed, in face of such 
a closed end group, one may very validly question the raison 
d *etre of these trusts. The funds for setting up these trusts 
come from the same source as the funds for the companies in 
which they hold their shares. Since the investment trusts* 
idea originated in India before the Government of India 
assumed some powers to prevent any concentration of share- 
ownership, one cannot plead that the investment trusts were 
operated to escape any anti-trust laws. The only explanation 
available is that these trusts could have originated to 
escape the steep income taxes that would have to be paid 
unless some other holding company was created. Whatever 
be the motive behind a trust, its ends are the same. The 
non-affiliated businessman cannot hone to get any substantial 
help from them. 
Similar is the case with the New Issue market. Indeed 
it is easier to place an issue privately for then it saves 
the expenses of floatation which sometimes may run as high 
as 10# of the total issue. 
In summary, it can be said that though in India the 
medium exists, advantage is taken of organized media and 
utilized to own ends by private interests. 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
Any Industrial enterprise is in need of two types 
of resources: investment capital and working capital. 
Investment would be obtained primarily by issuing shares 
or both. It can also be obtained by floating a loan 
issue possibly convertible at a later date into capital 
stock. Mortgage loan may also be used by pledging the 
assets of the company at a fairly long term of 7, 10 or 
1? years. The company may obtain such long-term loans 
by executing notes in favor of the lender, creating in 
this manner a charge on the assets. Working capital may 
be obtained by loans and advances. Since the term work¬ 
ing capital is understood here to mean the total of current 
assets, it is possible that a part of the working capital, 
the inventory, is financed through fairly long term loans. 
It is more commonly obtained through the banks. Such 
loans are also obtained through individual lenders. In¬ 
dustrial entrepreneurs in India avail themselves of all 
these sources. In the previous chapters informatory data 
have been presented. The objective of this chapter is to 
evaluate such data and to determine the weight of its con¬ 
tentions in the light of the problem posed. 
It was noticed that the organizational pattern of 
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capital financing is being increasingly westernized. Govern¬ 
mental efforts in this direction have been prominent. For 
the businessmen, the western pattern conferred a legal entity 
on their enterprises and at the same time provided tax ben¬ 
efits. It also made it possible for these businessmen to 
use these western patterns to wield a tight control over the 
financing of their enterprises. In this can be said that 
the operation of the western systems has remained typically 
Indian. 
It was seen in Chapter Two that internal sources, com- 
orised of depreciation and reserves, contributed a high per¬ 
centage of finances. It was observed that depreciation pro¬ 
visions compared favorably with those in other western 
countries, but it was also noticed that funds, earmarked for 
replacement, were utilized mainly for purposes other than 
replacement. Reserves were also created forming the other 
major internal source. The creation of reserves is in keep¬ 
ing with the western system, but the method of creating these 
reserves differs. In the first place, the unusual plurality 
of stock holding, shown in Table II.5, facilitated the tight 
control on the policy of the organization. With this control 
the company could restrict any grant of dividends, (See Table 
A.l in Appendix) for a long time and thus have a bigger share 
available. Also the nature of shareholding permitted a greater 
re-investment of profits distributed. In this, it can be said 
that the operational method is Indian. 
Such a reliance on internal financing is necessitated 
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by the refusal of commercial banks to provide any long term 
investment capital. In spite of the fact that the Banking 
Companies Act of 19^9, did not prohibit investment in shares 
or debentures, it was found that, (1) the organized sector 
of banking business is not interested in either subscribing 
\ 
to the share capital of Indian companies, nor is it interested 
in advancing any long term loans. (2) Its chief contribution 
to corporate financing is in furnishing short-term, self- 
liquidating loans made available through discounting of bills 
and made against hypothecation, inventory, an item which is 
not a permanent asset, figuring as the most prominent security. 
4 
While any long term advance was thus ruled out, it made 
hypothecation a mere formality allowing for a free play 
through such personal or group influences. (3) Even the 
advances that the banks did make, were not necessarily growth 
oriented. They were made without any such guiding principle. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from these findings. 
(1) Absence of long term investment financing from the banks 
forced the companies to rely more on their internal sources. 
(2) An entrepreneur who did not have the combined resources 
of a group-oriented control could not hope to survive in 
the absence of such help from banking business. In turn this 
absence indirectly precipitated such control. 
How the advantage of such a situation was taken is 
evident from the study of managing agency system. It is seen 
how the enterprises under the control of the managing agents 
are financed by them. Their function is manifold. Besides 
standing security to the bank loans and advances, they also 
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make loans available from Individuals on the strength of 
their own standing. Their individual loans to the companies 
are also considerable. Their position in the field of 
corporate financing and the fact that managing agencies are 
all personalized and family-oriented organizations emphasize 
the fact that Indian corporate enterprise derives much from 
personalized methods of financing. 
The situation was found to be discouraging with regard 
to availability of investment capital from the organized sector. 
The contribution of the insurance companies was not at all 
satisfactory. In spite of the huge resources available to 
them, their role in corporate sector was subordinate to 
their activities in other sectors, such as governmental and 
gilt-edged markets. They were attracted to these markets 
primarily because of the non-soeculative nature of these 
securities. Indeed till the formation of the LIC, this 
contribution to the corporate sector remained at a stationary 
level while their resources showed such a high increase. 
After the formation of the LIC this participation shows in¬ 
crease. However, this increase must be discounted for one 
reason. It may be recalled that the insurance companies, 
are restricted, by statute, to investing in shares and de¬ 
bentures of such companies, as have shown a creditable record 
of dividend distribution. This means that past performance of 
an existing company is a major consideration. In other words 
the investment policy is not growth oriented. Thus the 
statutory limitation results in supporting established firms 
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which are controlled by various groups and interests and 
denying such support to newer industries. 
That the underwriting activity in India has not shown 
any sustained progress, but rather has been characterized by 
sporadic growth was seen from the discussion. From the nature 
of their activity it can be discerned that the underwriting 
itself is not very useful to the expanding issue market. On 
the contrary it is the underwriters that benefit from the 
issue. Their underwriting activity is limited to issues that 
are backed by group interests and are thus bound to succeed 
on the virtue of intrinsic prestige. That the issues did not 
depend on underwriting for its success, but could find a ready 
market is evident from the fact that in 19?6 4*7.5# of the 
total Issue was floated without any underwriting assistance. 
To consider investment trusts to be on par with 
similar institutions in either the TJ.S. or the U.K., would 
be misrepresentation. Their closed end organization and 
close connection with the group Interests makes it difficult 
for them to play the role that similar organizations play 
in western countries. Whatever the object they were started 
with, they become the dumping ground for shares of their 
associated companies. 
Close examination of the stoclj; exchange activity 
leads to two conclusions. (1) As a media of channeling 
capital resources It is not a very effective source as a 
major portion of the total stock offered in a year is not 
placed on the exchange for issue at all. (2) The fact that 
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among the issues successful at the exchange, the Further 
Issues, which have the backing of their past performance 
and group affiliations, are dominant, shows that newer 
companies do not benefit from the stock exchange. Thus 
the organized sector does not offer any encouragement to 
the new enterprises that do not have the backing of any 
group. 
Such groups, however, are overwhelmingly family- 
oriented. Personalized identification with such groups and 
the family affiliations thereof have been mentioned in 
Chapter One. These could be reiterated. Under this class¬ 
ification would fall the role of the families of Goenkas, 
Bangurs and Kanorias play in firms like Shaw Wallace, 
Octavius Steel, Kettlewell Bullen and Anderson Wright. 
Similar position in the pharmaceutical Industry in Western 
India has been achieved by the leading families of Kas- 
turbhai Lalbhai and Sarabhais. So is the family of 
Mr. Mutthiah Chettiar active in the Madura Mills. How¬ 
ever an enumeration of the number of units owned by a 
business house in each of the several industries does not 
convey an idea of the real extent of its part in the in¬ 
dustry or its importance. Simply to say that the Kanpur 
house of Juggilal Kamlapat own one aluminum plant is to do 
injustice to the house. For the aluminum unit owned by 
them is one of the only two units in the country. A similar 
position has been attained by the House of Tatas, which 
manages the Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited, the largest 
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single producer of Iron and Steel in the entire country. 
Such Interests wield influence over a vast industrial 
field. Through the operation of the managing agency system 
and multiple interlocking directorships, these interests are 
able to retain their control and affect the working of the 
industrial enterprise. 
The powers they have and the effects of such a power 
concentration have to be measured negatively. That these 
groups have participated heavily in the industrial develop¬ 
ment of the country, can be seen from the figures of total 
issue which their companies floated. The focus of attention 
here is double, as explained in the introductory chapter. 
Given the resources of India and the internal market potential, 
it can be argued that the group initiated development has 
been a liability to Indian economic growth. As late as 
19531 this development was restricted to a few fields and 
not until the promulgation of different five year plans did 
this development acquire a sense of direction and purpose. 
What then, it may be posed guided the group in their activities. 
It is impossible here to speak in terms of a "mission to 
fulfill." There was no sense of obligation behind their 
activity. There were no principles of business philosophy. 
To this date, no reliable market surveys are available. The 
consumption figures, which the government puts out, are 
estimates and conjectures. It is difficult to imagine how 
an industrial organization could be set up and run, without 
the significant factual data that influence its purchasing, 
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manufacturing and sales policies. The explanation for the 
industrial aggrandizement that these groups possess has to 
be sought in non-economic areas. 
Could the acquisitive philosophy of the groups ensure 
the "ate of growth needed by India. Though these groups had 
the resources to support any bold, brave olan they wished to 
undertake, no such plan materialized. In the vacuum thus 
created government, through its various agencies, has been 
assuming a greater role. But the desirability of such a 
role can be anproprlately questioned. The increasingly active 
participation of governmental agencies in effect acknowledges 
the Impossibility of improving upon the existing framework 
of industrial financing institutions. 
Improvement can be effected in two ways, by importing 
new techniques or by changing the established methods. It 
was implicitly suggested, while discussing the role of banks 
in Germany, that the Ind4an banks also adopt such methods. 
t 
Such an adoption would merely involve onening of additional 
departments to assist the existing ones and to that extent 
would coordinate the existing efforts. A phased program 
to provide such services would not have to necessitate a 
large dose of abrupt change and thus the transition would 
be easier. 
Besides, banking,there are nossibilities of improve¬ 
ment in other fields too. Reorganization of investment trusts 
could be cited as a primary need. Public participation, 
liberal dividend policies would attract favorable public 
I 
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support. A higher rate of interest for debentures would 
allow them to compete with governmental bonds and attract 
the large segment of non-speculative investment capital 
seeking higher earnings. A change in concept of shares, 
from the present face value procedure to par value procedure 
would be desirable. The investment trusts, the banks and 
insurance companies could very profitably explore the 
possibility of establishing a consortium which will engage 
itself exclusively in long term loans, of not less than 7-10 
year duration, extending up to a maximum of 15 years. This 
would free the excessive burden placed now on the internal 
t 
finances and would permit a healthier dividend policy on 
part of the companies. 
It is not very difficult to suggest possible avenues 
- | ' <1 , V * 
of improvement, but the difficulty lies in implementing them# 
The present situation presents obstacles which will have to 
be surmounted by purely internal reorganization or face the 
increasing governmental participation. India has the 
organization for industrial financing but she lac.^s the 
principles of operation. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLE A.l 
DIVIDEND DISTRIBUTION BY INDIAN COMPANIES 
Industry 
Group 
Total number of 
companies con¬ 
sidered In each 
group 
Number of Companies 
paying consistent 
dividend 
10 years 5 years 
Coal 63 21 5 
Cotton Textile 21 5 3 
Jute 58 11 9 
Cement 10 6 - 
Electric Equipment 21 15 4 
Engineering 30 12 7 
Paper 12 6 2 
Sugar 33 10 9 
Tea 138 27 ^3 
Miscellaneous 107 15 
Insurance 9  .... 3  2 
Total 571 213 109 
Source: S 
Markett Calcutta* 
. K. Sur. Stock Exchange and New 
1961, Pp. TJT?r 
Issue 
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